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INTRODUCTION
Governments lie. They do so for many different reasons to a wide range of
audiences on a variety of topics. Examples include lies about the government’s
justifications for military action, such as allegations that Presidents Monroe and
Madison lied to Congress about military activities in the then-territory of Florida,1
that President Polk lied about the incidents leading the United States to engage in
war with Mexico,2 that members of the Johnson administration lied about the events
that spurred broader U.S. involvement in Vietnam,3 and that members of the Bush
administration lied about the reasons for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.4 Other examples
include deliberate falsehoods about whether a government official or agency acted

† Copyright © 2015 Helen Norton.
* Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. For their thoughtful comments,
thanks to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Alan Chen, Rick Collins, Caroline Mala Corbin, Stuart
Green, Melissa Hart, Kenny Johnson, Heidi Kitrosser, Toni Massaro, Steve Morrison, Scott
Moss, Raja Rajunath, Nantiya Ruan, Nadia Sawicki, Pierre Schlag, Seana Shiffrin, Alex
Tsesis, and participants at the University of Colorado faculty works-in-progress series, the
Loyola Law School Constitutional Law Colloquium, and the Yale Free Expression Scholars
Conference. Thanks too to Cassady Adams and Adam Kutniewski for excellent research
assistance, and to Diana Avelis for outstanding administrative support.
1. See Peter W. Morgan, The Undefined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and
the Rule of Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 177, 223 (1992).
2. See id. at 216–21.
3. See ERIC ALTERMAN, WHEN PRESIDENTS LIE 162 (2004); GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES 517 (2004) (“[The Pentagon Papers] revealed that the American government
had systematically lied to the American people about the nature, purpose, conduct, and
consequences of an ongoing war.”).
4. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE 5 (2011).
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in compliance with law,5 like those told by Nixon administration officials as part of
the Watergate cover-up6 as well as Reagan administration officials’ alleged lies about
their involvement in Nicaragua.7 Still others concern the existence or scope of a
government program, such as the Eisenhower administration’s false claim that
Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 plane was an off-track weather aircraft8 or Obama
administration officials’ assertions about the sweep of domestic surveillance and data
collection efforts.9 The list goes on and includes a wide range of lies to achieve
various domestic and foreign policy goals, such as the Kennedy administration’s lies
during the Cuban Missile Crisis about the extent of its knowledge of the location of
Soviet missiles.10
Although courts and commentators have extensively explored whether and when
the First Amendment permits the government to regulate lies told by private
speakers,11 relatively little attention has yet been paid to the constitutional
implications of the government’s deliberate falsehoods.12 This Article helps fill that
gap by exploring when, if ever, the Constitution prohibits our government from lying
to us.
The government’s lies can be devastating. This is the case, for example, of its lies
told to resist legal and political accountability for its misconduct; to inflict economic
and reputational harm; or to enable the exercise of its powers to imprison, to deploy
lethal force, and to commit precious national resources. On the other hand, the
government’s lies can sometimes be helpful: consider lies told to thwart a military

5. See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 262–76 (2009) (describing
Brandeis’s efforts in private practice to prove that President Taft had lied about whether he
had personally investigated charges against, and prepared a memorandum exonerating, the
Secretary of Interior).
6. See William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 458 (1999).
7. See ALTERMAN, supra note 3, at 240–41, 279–88.
8. See JIM NEWTON, EISENHOWER: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 313–15 (2011).
9. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 467 (2014) (describing Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper’s testimony to Congress).
10. See Arthur Sylvester, The Government Has the Right to Lie, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, Nov. 18, 1967, at 10 (acknowledging that during the Cuban Missile Crisis he—as
Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy—knowingly approved a press release
that falsely stated that “‘the Pentagon has no information indicating the presence of offensive
weapons in Cuba’”).
11. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking down a federal statute
that criminalized certain lies about receiving military honors as a violation of the First
Amendment); Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008).
12. David Strauss and Jonathan Varat are among the exceptions, as they have considered
the problem of government lies as part of broader explorations of lies’ First Amendment
implications. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 355–59 (1991); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment:
A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108–10
(2006). Others have examined the constitutionality of law enforcement officers’ lies. See infra
notes 85–102 and accompanying text.
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adversary or to identify wrongdoing through undercover police work. The substantial
harms threatened by some government lies invite a search for ways to punish and
prevent them. At the same time, however, the number of lies, the diversity of reasons
for which they are told, and the variety of their effects combine to suggest that efforts
to enforce blanket prohibitions against the government’s deliberate falsehoods would
be both difficult and unwise.13 This Article seeks to identify constitutional and other
approaches that attend to these concerns by constraining government lies that
threaten especially serious harms. To this end, it examines when (and why) we find
government lies most troubling, when those lies pose harms of constitutional
magnitude, and when nonconstitutional options might more appropriately address
the dangers of such lies.
Part I considers the harms threatened by government lies as well as the challenges
posed by efforts to constrain them. More specifically, it examines the specific harms of
deception and breach of trust that the government’s deliberate falsehoods can inflict
upon individual targets as well as upon the broader public. Like other forms of
deception, the government’s lies not only inflict moral harm by undermining their
targets’ autonomy but can also injure their targets’ interests in more tangible ways—as
is the case, for example, of government lies that deprive their targets of life or liberty,
or that impose reputational or economic damage. The government’s lies can also
breach the public’s trust in ways that inflict not only the moral and ethical harms of
disloyalty but also impose substantial instrumental costs to its effectiveness. Efforts to
constrain the government’s lies, however, can pose dangers of their own, and Part I
goes on to examine significant concerns about courts’ limited institutional competence,
about undermining the separation of governmental powers, and about chilling
government speakers’ willingness to engage in important expressive endeavors.
Part II then searches for constitutional principles that attend to these competing
concerns and proposes a framework for assessing the constitutionality of the
government’s deliberate falsehoods. More specifically, it builds on due process and
free speech theory and doctrine to identify when and how the government’s lies
inflict the harms of deception and breach of trust in ways that endanger specific
individual rights.
First, it proposes that the government’s lies violate the Due Process Clause when
they directly deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property or when they are
sufficiently coercive to constitute the functional equivalent of such deprivations.
Examples include prosecutors’ lies to judges and juries that lead to a defendant’s
imprisonment; law enforcement officers’ lies that coerce their targets’ involuntary
waiver of constitutional rights; and government lies that deprive their targets of the
ability meaningfully to exercise voting, reproductive, or other protected rights. The
government’s lies can also violate the Due Process Clause in those extreme
circumstances when they lack any reasonable justification—that is, when they shock
the conscience with their outrageousness—and thus constitute an abuse of
governmental power.

13. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining
the difficulties raised by government efforts to regulate private speakers’ lies in light of “the
pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for worse motives, made thoughtlessly
or deliberately, made with or without accompanying harm”).
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Part II further proposes that the government’s lies violate the Free Speech Clause
when they are sufficiently coercive of their targets’ beliefs or speech to constitute the
functional equivalent of the government’s direct regulation of that expressive
activity. Examples include the government’s lies to or about its critics to silence,
deter, or otherwise punish their speech, or the government’s lies to captive or
otherwise vulnerable audiences to manipulate their expressive choices.
Because the Constitution does not provide the only possible constraint on the
government’s deliberate falsehoods, Part III then explores various nonconstitutional
means for addressing some harmful government lies. It identifies a menu of statutory
and political possibilities that target the government’s deliberate falsehoods on
certain subjects, to certain audiences, by certain speakers, or in other settings that
threaten especially grave harm.
Part IV applies these various approaches, both constitutional and nonconstitutional,
to a range of problems. In so doing, it seeks to start a conversation about how courts,
policymakers, and the public might think about the constitutional and other
implications of the government’s lies.
I start with several caveats. First, this Article addresses the collective speech of a
government body or the speech of an individual empowered to speak for such a
body.14 It does not address the very different constitutional issues raised by efforts to
regulate lies by an individual government official when expressing her own views in
a personal capacity.15 Unlike such individuals—who possess First Amendment rights
of their own—the government is constrained rather than protected by the
Constitution and does not itself hold First Amendment rights.16 Examples of the
government’s own speech (to which the Article returns in Part IV) include a state
agency that lies to certain audiences about when the polls will close in hopes of
suppressing their vote and increasing its political allies’ re-election prospects, or that
deliberately misstates unemployment rates to improve the incumbent’s prospects in
an upcoming election. Or a governor’s office that issues an investigative report that
deliberately and falsely covers up its own incompetence or illegal conduct. Or an

14. See, e.g., Beth Orsoff, Note, Government Speech as Government Censorship, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 229, 248 (1993) (“When a government official sends out a letter, pamphlet, or
other written instrument on government stationery or government letterhead or uses any seal
of the government, then the official has sent an official government communication.”).
15. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377–82 (2014) (discussing the First Amendment
rights of individual public employees); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(same). Elsewhere I address the constitutional implications of laws that punish campaign lies
by individual candidates who have First Amendment rights of their own. See Helen Norton,
Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Governmental Power in LAW AND LIES 143,
176–90 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.” (emphasis in original));
MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 44–45 (1983) (arguing that government does not
possess First Amendment free speech rights). As explained in more detail, infra notes 125–27
and accompanying text, the Court’s recognition of a government speech defense to Free Speech
Clause claims is better understood as holding that government has a privilege, rather than a right,
to its own speech.
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agency that posts on its website a press release stating that one of its critics had
engaged in illegal misconduct when it knows she had not. Or an Office of the
Surgeon General that undertakes an informational campaign in the public schools
that seeks to boost sales of a product manufactured by the administration’s political
ally by falsely reporting its health effects. Or a President who, in order to build
support for military action abroad, tells Congress and the public in her State of the
Union address that she has evidence that a foreign government violated American
territorial space when she knows that she does not possess such evidence.
Second, this Article focuses on the constitutional implications of the
government’s lies to the American public, not those to non-Americans abroad.17
Finally, in this Article I use “lie” to mean a false assertion of fact known by the
speaker to be untrue and made with the intention that the listener understand it to be
true.18 This Article thus focuses only on the government’s deliberate falsehoods,
rather than on the many other ways in which the government may intentionally or
unintentionally mislead the public through, for example, secrets or accidental
inaccuracies.19 I chose this narrower scope in large part because the moral and
instrumental harms caused by the government’s intentional lies are arguably greater
than those caused by its nondisclosures and inaccuracies more generally, and thus
make more immediate demands for our attention.20 I recognize not only that others

17. The Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitution does not generally protect
noncitizens overseas. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990)
(declining to apply Fourth Amendment protections extraterritorially to aliens); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784–85 (1950) (declining to apply Fifth Amendment protections
extraterritorially to aliens).
18. See DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH 50 (1993) (“[W]e can say that lying
means making a statement (not too vague) you want somebody to believe, even though you
don’t (completely) believe it yourself, when the other person has a right to expect you mean
what you say.”); Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False
Statements of Fact 2 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737930 [http://perma.cc
/Q2S8-EEHU] (defining a lie as “(a) a false statement, (b) known by the person making it to
be false, and (c) made with the intention that at least some listeners will believe the statement
to be true, at least for some period before its falsity becomes evident to the listeners” (citation
omitted)).
19. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13 (1978)
(describing the many ways in which a speaker can deceive her audience, including “through
gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence”). A number
of thoughtful commentators have addressed in detail the potential harms of certain government
secrets. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 881, 885 (2008).
20. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts
Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 177 (2001)
(distinguishing various types of deception more broadly as “afford[ing] the listener the
opportunity for more precise questioning, which bald-faced lies generally do not”); Mark
Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1203, 1235 (2008) (“[T]he harm caused by sincerely believed false speech is generally
outweighed by its capacity to drive argumentation, which in turn furthers the collection,
dissemination, and preservation of evidence supporting true beliefs.”); Strauss, supra note 12,
at 356 (“Ordinarily, withholding information is not as effective as lying [in offending listener
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may choose to define a “lie” differently21 but also that determinations of what is (and
is not) a lie in a particular situation can be deeply contested regardless of the
definition one selects.22 Here I do not seek to revisit debates about whether the
government did or did not lie in any given instance. Although thoughtful observers
may well disagree about the size and shape of the universe of government lies, I
assume for purposes of this Article that there is some universe of government lies
and consider what, if anything, the Constitution has to say about it.
I. THE POTENTIAL HARMS OF GOVERNMENT LIES AND OF EFFORTS
TO CONSTRAIN THEM
This Part starts by considering the variety of ways in which the government’s lies
can cause moral and instrumental harm to specific individuals as well as to the public
collectively.23 It then examines the substantial chilling, institutional competence, and
separation of powers issues raised by efforts to enforce limitations on the
government’s lies. As we shall see, there are good reasons for concern about
government lies, as well as good reasons to worry about efforts to constrain them.
A. The Harms Threatened by the Government’s Lies
Although in many respects the harms of government lies track those of
nongovernmental speakers more generally (e.g., in their disrespect for listeners’
autonomy and dignity),24 the government’s deliberate falsehoods can also threaten
distinct and especially serious damage precisely because of their governmental
source. This subpart describes government lies’ potential harms to specific

autonomy] because a lie affirmatively throws the hearer off the track.”).
21. See, e.g., SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND
THE LAW 116 (2014) (“[A] lie is an assertion that the speaker knows she does not believe, but
nevertheless deliberately asserts, in a context that, objectively interpreted, represents that
assertion as to be taken by the listener as true and as believed by the speaker. . . . [W]hat I call
‘pure lies’ need not involve deception or the intent to deceive. They need not even be false; a
speaker may lie by asserting what she believes to be false yet, unbeknownst to her, happens to
be true.”).
22. See Steven R. Morrison, When is Lying Illegal? When Should It Be? A Critical
Analysis of the Federal False Statements Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2009)
(questioning whether truth and falsity are meaningfully distinguishable for certain legal
purposes).
23. Although this Part focuses on the harms that lies inflict upon listeners or targets, lies
may harm the individual liars themselves in both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist
ways. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 60 (1978) (discussing arguments that lies
undermine the dignity and humanity of the liar); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police
Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 468 (1996) (“Lying leads to a loss of integrity
individual to the [police] officer. . . . In a society that generally condemns lying, using that
tactic diminishes one’s self respect. Officers have feelings of regret for their lying, even though
they value its believed utility.”).
24. Elsewhere I have discussed some of the harms threatened by nongovernmental
speakers’ lies. Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 185–200.
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individuals as well as to the general public, and how those harms may vary with the
lies’ motive, subject matter, and audience.
1. Deception
The harms of lies in general and lies by the government in particular center on the
liar’s effort to manipulate the listener in ways that are inherently disrespectful of the
listener’s autonomy and dignity. As Harry Frankfurt explains,
The most irreducibly bad thing about lies is that they contrive to
interfere with, and to impair, our natural effort to apprehend the real state
of affairs. They are designed to prevent us from being in touch with what
is really going on. In telling his lie, the liar tries to mislead us into
believing that the facts are other than they actually are. He tries to impose
his will on us.25
Government lies on certain topics or to certain audiences may be especially
successful in manipulating listeners because they may be more likely to be believed
and less amenable to rebuttal by counterspeech.26 Examples include the
government’s lies on matters on which the government has a monopoly or to which
it has other special access (e.g., executive branch lies about certain national security
and intelligence topics) as well as government lies to vulnerable audiences (e.g., to
young children in the public schools).
Lies not only inflict moral harm by undermining their target’s autonomy, but they
can also set back their target’s interests in more tangible ways.27 More specifically,
some government lies can deprive their targets of life or liberty—as is the case, for
example, of lies told by prosecutors to secure criminal convictions.28 The lies told by

25. Harry Frankfurt, On Truth, Lies, and Bullshit, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 37, 37
(Clancy Martin ed., 2009); see also FRIED, supra note 23, at 67 (“Lying is wrong because when
I lie I set up a relation which is essentially exploitative. . . . When I lie, I lay claim to your mind.”);
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (1987) (“The
case for honesty in all human relations, I believe, rests in part on the importance of treating
others with respect: lack of candor often carries with it the implication that the listener is less
capable of dealing with the truth, and thus less worthy of respect, than the speaker.”).
26. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the Prospect
of Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims before the Use of Force, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 433, 442 (2010) (“A barrier to achieving this kind of contemporaneous
accountability for threat claims asserted by the executive department to build support for the
use of force is its superior access to and control over the intelligence information that forms
the basis of the claims.”).
27. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING 34–39 (2006)
(distinguishing “morally wrongful” acts as those that intrinsically violate a freestanding moral
duty from “harmful” acts as those that inflict consequences that set back another’s interests or
otherwise interfere with her well-being).
28. See Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a prosecutor’s
knowingly false statements to the jury that a key government witness had not confessed to
murder were fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of due process); United States v.
Kalfayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a prosecutor’s knowingly false
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government officials to justify the internment of thousands of Japanese American
citizens during World War II offer a particularly egregious example:
The evidence of the government’s misconduct in these cases is clear
and compelling, and rests on the government’s own records. It reveals that
high government officials, including the Solicitor General, knowingly
presented the Supreme Court with false and fabricated records, both in
briefs and oral arguments, that misled the Court and resulted in decisions
that deprived the petitioners in these cases of their rights to fair hearings of
their challenges to military orders that were based, not on legitimate fears
that they—and all Japanese Americans—posed a danger of espionage and
sabotage on the West Coast, but rather reflected the racism of the general
who promulgated the orders. 29
Other government lies may inflict reputational or economic damage upon their
individual targets.30 Examples include law enforcement agency lies that falsely brand
individuals as criminals31 and government officials’ false declarations that targeted
individuals have engaged in other forms of misconduct.32 Government lies can also
inflict tangible harm upon the American public collectively. Government lies to
justify the deployment of troops, for instance, can result in demonstrable injury
through the loss of life and the depletion of national resources.33

statement to the jury that an absent witness could have refused to testify was willful
prosecutorial misconduct of sufficiently prejudicial nature to violate due process).
29. PETER IRONS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE CASE FOR SUPREME COURT REPUDIATION OF
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 4 (2013); see also Korematsu v. United States,
584 F. Supp. 1406, 1418–22 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting Mr. Korematsu’s coram nobis petition
and describing evidence of government lies in the earlier proceedings); Eric K. Yamamoto,
White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President
Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 292–93 (2005)
(describing lies by the executive and military to the public and the courts that sought to justify
the internment).
30. For discussion of the reputational and economic harms threatened by government
agencies’ inaccurate assertions (including but not limited to those that are intentionally false),
see Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2011) (“Agency publicity can be premature, excessive, misleading,
or just plain wrong.”); James O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring Remedies
for Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (2003) (describing how agency
website statements may be inaccurate in ways that harm their targets).
31. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976) (describing police department’s allegedly
defamatory description of the target as an “active shoplifter[]”).
32. For examples of alleged defamation by various government officials, see Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123 (1979) (senator issued press releases and newsletters criticizing
researcher’s studies); Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Congressman wrote—and released to the press—a letter complaining that legal services
attorney was obstructing enforcement of child support laws); Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (state government officials issued press
releases and press statements claiming that protestors had engaged in violent and destructive
behavior).
33. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and
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2. Breach of Trust
By violating its public’s trust, the government’s lies can inflict moral harms of
disloyalty in addition to and distinct from the harms of deception.34 Seana Shiffrin,
for example, has emphasized that
the primary, distinctive wrong of lies as such does not inhere in their
deceptive effect, if any, on listeners, but instead in their abuse of the
mechanism by which we provide reliable testimonial warrants, a
mechanism we must safeguard if we are to understand and cooperate
with one another and to achieve our mandatory moral ends.35
As Professor Shiffrin explains, lies by the government can pose especially grave
dangers of this sort:
Politically, those in charge of putting our joint moral commitments into
action and enforcing them—namely, state officials—are well placed to
serve as points of triangulation, expositors, and repositories of our best
information about the law and its moral and political underpinnings. We
need salient common sources of information to help us locate the relevant
moral and legal facts and to identify the content of the joint perception
of those facts. We also need to know that officials believe these to be the
relevant facts, if those officials are to merit the role of a legitimate
political (not merely epistemic) authority. Thus, state officials, at least in
a democracy, must aspire to be relevant epistemic authorities on the law
and on at least that aspect of morality embodied in law. We should be
able to rely on their transmissions about the content of law, legally
relevant morality, and legally relevant facts.36
Public fiduciary theory offers a related way of understanding the government’s
lies as acts of disloyalty that inflict substantial collective harm by violating the
public’s trust. Drawing from private law’s imposition of fiduciary obligations upon
those who have discretionary power over the interests of others, this growing body
of literature observes that government actors assert the same sort of power with
respect to the public; public fiduciary theorists thus urge the public (as beneficiary)
to expect the same loyalty from its government as it would from other fiduciaries.37

Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 103
(2004) (“Wars kill people, topple governments, and scar survivors and the ecosystems they
inhabit. In no other context can government error or malfeasance do greater harm.”).
34. See Alan Strudler, Deception and Trust, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION, supra
note 25, at 139, 152 (“It is always morally unacceptable to deceive a person in a way that
breaches his trust, unless that deception is necessary to defend against a grave wrong. But it
may be morally acceptable to defend [sic] a person in the absence of trust if that deception is
necessary to defend against an action that may thwart one’s legitimate interests.”); see also
GREEN, supra note 27, at 103 (distinguishing the moral harms of disloyalty—i.e., breach of
trust—from other morally wrongful acts).
35. SHIFFRIN, supra note 21, at 116.
36. Id. at 198 (emphasis in original).
37. See David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative
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The government’s self-interested lies to its public can thus breach the public’s trust
in, and expectations of loyalty from, its government.
Government lies breach the public’s trust in ways that can inflict not only such
moral and ethical harms but also substantial instrumental costs. John Mearsheimer
describes these costs to include thwarting the public’s ability to hold government
accountable for misconduct, frustrating citizens’ ability to make informed voting
choices, undermining the policy-making process when participants cannot rely on
others’ assertions, and alienating the public’s faith in democratic governance.38 The
less the public trusts the government, the less the public will cooperate with it, and
the less effective the government, in turn, will be—with the public suffering
collective harm as a result.39 As just one illustration, the various lies told by
government officials as part of the Watergate cover-up imposed these sorts of
instrumental costs to public trust and confidence.40 Relatedly, some commentators
argue that lies by law enforcement officers to secure confessions or consent to search
can undermine citizens’ willingness to trust and cooperate with the police in ways
that frustrate law enforcement’s effectiveness.41 Judges’ lies similarly threaten to

Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2011) (“The fiduciary duties are routinely described
as a duty of loyalty and a duty of care – as well as duties of candor, disclosure, and utmost
good faith. . . . Most centrally, fiduciaries have a duty of loyalty which prohibits them from
acting in a self-interested manner. The duty requires that fiduciaries act for the sole benefit of
the beneficiary and prohibits their acting in any manner where their interests conflict with the
interests of the beneficiary.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
38. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 84–86; see also ALTERMAN, supra note 3, at 14
(“Without public honesty, the process of voting becomes an exercise in manipulation rather
than the expression of the consent of the governed. Many a scholar has persuasively argued
that official deception may be convenient, but over time, it undermines the bond of trust
between the government and the people that is essential to the functioning of a democracy.”);
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 94 (“[H]iding botched policies can lead to further disasters
down the road, not just because incompetents are usually kept in key leadership positions for
at least some period of time, but also because engaging in cover-ups makes it difficult to have
a national security system in which policymakers and military commanders are held
accountable for their actions.”); Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May
Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1112 (2010) (“If citizens expect public
officials to mislead them, they will become wary of arguments offered in public discourse.”).
39. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas:
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 483 (1995) (describing how individuals’ trust in leaders’
authority increases their willingness to comply with those leaders’ directives).
40. See Simon, supra note 6, at 458 (describing lies told by government officials as part
of the Watergate cover-up as “particularly noxious because they were intended to subvert
democratic processes of political accountability”).
41. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 835–42
(2008) (arguing that common perceptions that law enforcement officers engage in deceit and
other illegitimate behavior discourage public compliance with the law); Young, supra note 23,
at 458–59 (“As knowledge of police lying spreads, trust of police will decrease and citizens
will be less likely to come forward and talk honestly with police. Critical evidence may remain
undiscovered or undisclosed.”); Jamie Masten, Note, “Ain’t No Snitches Ridin’ Wit’ Us”: How
Deception in the Fourth Amendment Triggered the Stop Snitching Movement, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
705, 708–09 (2009) (arguing that police deception has triggered public resistance to
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undermine citizens’ faith in the legitimacy of the justice system and their willingness
to rely upon and cooperate with it.42 In short, government lies can inflict the harms
of disloyalty in ways that severely injure not only targeted individuals but also the
broader public.
B. The Challenges Posed by Efforts To Enforce Constraints on
the Government’s Lies
The range of substantial harms threatened by the government’s lies invites a
search for ways to prevent and punish them. But efforts to enforce constraints on the
government’s deliberate falsehoods can pose challenges and perhaps even dangers
of their own. More specifically, such enforcement efforts trigger significant concerns
about courts’ limited institutional competence, about undermining the separation of
governmental powers, and about chilling government speakers’ willingness to
engage in important expressive endeavors.
1. Institutional Competence
Even those deeply troubled by the potential dangers of government lies may
remain skeptical of courts’ institutional competence to police them.43 As David
Strauss explains,
For the courts to enforce a prohibition against government lying or
nondisclosure, they would have to make a delicate and complex inquiry
into precisely what information was in the government’s possession.
They would then have to determine the government’s reasons for the
nondisclosure or false statements. . . . Institutional concerns, therefore,
rather than any theoretical weakness, explain why the autonomy
justification for the persuasion principle has not given rise to a judicially
enforced first amendment prohibition against false statements by the

cooperation with the police).
42. See EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE 48 (2011) (“Citizens of full constitutional
stature rightly recognize that, if justices do in fact lie to each other, they also necessarily lie to
us. Citizens will also sense that acts of judicial untruthfulness can treat us as less than equal
or as persons whose true consent does not matter to judicial legitimacy.”); Micah
Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 991 (2008) (“Unless judges are sincere,
the grounds for their decisions cannot be scrutinized in the public domain. And without such
scrutiny, those subject to adjudication cannot determine whether the reasons given to them are
sound.”). Paul Butler, on the other hand, is among those to argue that judicial lies are
sometimes justified to thwart injustice. Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They Should),
91 MINN. L. REV. 1785, 1785–86 (2007) (“Sometimes [lying] is the best of the imperfect
choices that judges have when they are confronted with unjust law. This Article recommends
judicial lying only when it will thwart extreme injustice . . . .”).
43. See YUDOF, supra note 16, at 301 (“The danger that, in attempting to recalibrate
communications networks, courts will create more problems than they solve is greatest when
judicial intervention is greatest—when the courts rely on the Constitution to provide direct
limits on government expression.”).
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On the other hand, such challenges are not without precedent, as courts make
similarly complex assessments of motive and falsity in a wide range of constitutional,
statutory, and common law contexts.45 Constitutional doctrine, for example,
frequently requires courts to identify and evaluate the motives underlying
governmental decisions in a number of areas.46 In addition, as detailed by Gregory
Klass, a wide-ranging “‘law of deception’” (that includes “the torts of deceit,
negligent misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and defamation; criminal fraud statutes;
[and] securities law, which includes both disclosure duties and penalties for false
statements”) often calls upon courts to make a variety of similar determinations
regarding falsity and intent.47
2. Separation of Powers
Reliance on constitutional litigation to constrain government’s deliberate
falsehoods requires the judiciary to evaluate the policy choices of the politically
accountable branches. Separation of powers concerns may thus leave judges
themselves reluctant to enforce constitutional limitations on the government’s lies.48

44. Strauss, supra note 12, at 359; see id. at 358–59 (“Specifically, prohibitions against
government lying and manipulative government nondisclosure may be examples of a principle
of free expression that is underenforced by the courts. Although the principles underlying the
first amendment (under either the persuasion principle or the Meiklejohn theory) should
prohibit government action of this kind, that is not a limitation that the courts can implement.”
(footnote omitted)). That judges may themselves sometimes lie further compounds this
challenge. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
45. For arguments rebutting institutional competence concerns in related contexts, see
Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 914–16 (responding to separation of powers and judicial
competence concerns about courts’ ability to police unlawful government secret keeping); D.
Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013) (describing
public fiduciary theory as responsive to concerns about courts’ institutional competence to
assess other governmental actors and observing that judges frequently enforce related
fiduciary duties in the private law context).
46. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
710–21 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the search for impermissible government motive in equal
protection doctrine).
47. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J.
449, 449 (2012); see also id. at 480–81 (noting that there are often good reasons to let judges
and juries determine a message’s falsity and the speaker’s state of mind).
48. As Jonathan Varat observed:
Nor, for example, if President Bush used erroneous information in making the
case for going to war in Iraq, misleading those who were asked to support his
policy, is it likely that a court would hold that the First Amendment itself required
the president to issue a correction, or to be held liable for damages, even if it
were proved that he knew he was making a false statement at the time.
Varat, supra note 12, at 1133; see also Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 1017, 1071 (2003) (“Underlying this judicial reluctance to find vindictiveness and
selectivity, or even to give defendants the tools they might need to prove them, are real
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Recall that in other contexts such concerns (along with concerns about judicial
competence and the management of limited resources) have led courts to create and
apply a variety of doctrines to narrow the circumstances under which the judiciary is
empowered to second-guess the other branches; these include a range of
governmental immunities,49 as well as standing, political question, and other
justiciability doctrines.50
These barriers, however, are not necessarily insuperable. As the Supreme Court
has made clear,51 preserving the availability of the courts’ checking function is
especially important when governments act in politically popular ways that
nonetheless undermine key constitutional values (e.g., when a government seeks to
punish or silence a politically weak or unpopular critic52) or when governments seek
to entrench themselves in defiance of political controls (e.g., when the government
seeks to manipulate election outcomes53). To this end, courts have recognized a
variety of limits on and exceptions from the justiciability doctrines to help ensure
that an independent judiciary remains available in appropriate circumstances to
check the political branches.54 Some of the harms inflicted by the government’s lies
are more individualized and targeted than others, for example, and are thus more
likely to satisfy the requirements of standing doctrine.55 In addition, governmental
immunities generally operate to bar only suits for money damages and not suits

concerns for the separation of powers . . . .”).
49. For example, the Court has held that certain functions are so key to effective
government to require absolute immunity from money damages for government actors found
to have violated the law when engaged in those functions. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 227–29 (1988) (discussing absolute immunity for judges performing certain judicial
actions); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that the President is absolutely
immune from civil damages liability for his official acts). Even when engaged in functions
that do not trigger absolute immunity, government actors found to have violated the
Constitution may nevertheless enjoy “qualified immunity” from money damages so long as
they did not violate law that was clearly established at the time and of which a reasonable
person would have been aware. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).
50. E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (ruling that a federal judge’s
challenge to the Senate’s impeachment process was a nonjusticiable political question); City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (finding that the plaintiff had no standing to seek
injunctive relief from the police department’s allegedly unconstitutional use of chokeholds
because he could not show that he was imminently vulnerable to again being subjected to a
chokehold).
51. E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
52. E.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 897 (2012)
(describing how the government sought to shut down the publication of leaked information by
targeting pressure on the relatively unknown WikiLeaks rather than the more mainstream and
powerful New York Times).
53. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down state legislatures’ refusal
to reapportion state legislative districts to reflect major demographic changes as violation of
Equal Protection Clause requirement of “‘one person, one vote’”).
54. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection challenge to
states’ refusal to redistrict was not a political question and was thus justiciable).
55. See infra notes 159–160 and accompanying text for additional discussion of whether
and when government lies inflict harms that would satisfy the requirements of standing
doctrine.
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seeking injunctive relief, and in certain circumstances even immunities from
damages may be limited, waived, or otherwise overcome to achieve important public
purposes.56
3. Unintended Consequences: Chilling Valuable Government Speech
Just as the government’s regulation of private speakers’ falsehoods may
sometimes threaten to chill valuable speech,57 so too may be the case of efforts to
regulate the government’s own lies. Indeed, measures that constrain government lies
may chill both truthful government speech as well as certain beneficial government
lies.58
First, efforts to constrain government lies may chill government speakers in ways
that deprive the public of accurate and thus valuable information. As Mark Yudof
observed, requiring government to guarantee truth in its expression might inhibit it
from performing important information-gathering and public-communication
functions.59 One can easily imagine efforts by the government’s partisan political
opponents or by those it has legitimately targeted for enforcement action to exploit
constitutional litigation (or the threat thereof) to delay or squelch important
government speech.60

56. E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (declining to find that prosecutor’s
allegedly false statements made when announcing defendant’s indictment fell within zone of
prosecutorial functions absolutely immune from damages liability). For extensive and
thoughtful discussion of various immunities (and their exceptions) from liability for
unconstitutional actions, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts,
99 VA. L. REV. 207 (2013).
57. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“Although the erroneous
statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free
debate. . . . And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise
of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.”); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282–83 (1964) (concluding that the imposition of damages liability
for merely negligent false statements about public officials threatens to chill valuable political
criticism).
58. Note that government speech can be valuable even if it is not constitutionally
protected. Thus I do not claim that the government has a First Amendment right to its speech
even as I note that its speech has value.
59. See YUDOF, supra note 16, at 46. In a decision most famous for its commerce clause
ruling, the Supreme Court relied on related pragmatic grounds to reject a challenger’s efforts
to invalidate the results of a referendum based on the Secretary of Agriculture’s allegedly
misleading speech. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1942) (“To hold that a speech
by a Cabinet officer, which failed to meet judicial ideals of clarity, precision, and
exhaustiveness, may defeat a policy embodied in an Act of Congress, would invest
communication between administrators and the people with perils heretofore unsuspected.”).
60. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 199–226 (expressing related concern that statutory
prohibitions on lying to the government could be inappropriately enforced against government
speakers by the government’s political enemies for political or other reasons); O’Reilly, supra
note 30, at 546 (“A primary concern for regulators is to reduce the ability of an affected entity
to prevent, remove, or mitigate the appearance of a piece of accurate data on the agency
website or other information product concerning that entity. If [inaccurate government speech
were actionable], there could be abuse of the new process by affected entities seeking delay or
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We may thus fear that the prospect of litigation to enforce constitutional
constraints on the government’s lies might deter some valuable government
expression. Here too such concerns are substantial but not necessarily irrefutable.
Recall that I have defined a “lie” for purposes of this Article to mean a false statement
known by the speaker to be untrue and made with the intention that the listener
understand it to be true. As the Court has acknowledged in related contexts, legal
constraints that target only intentionally false factual assertions carry less potential
for chilling valuable expression than do measures that sweep more broadly (for
example, those that regulate speech on matters other than those that are demonstrably
true or false or those that require speakers’ accuracy regardless of any culpable
mental state).61 Moreover, as the Court has recognized in the context of commercial
speech,62 chilling may be less of a concern with respect to speakers like the
government that have strong incentives to continue to speak.
Second, some government lies in certain contexts may have value in their own
right, as can be the case of government’s deliberate falsehoods motivated by certain
public purposes. Examples may include lies told to foil adversaries in times of war
as well as the lies about their identities told by undercover police officers or civil
rights enforcement testers seeking to identify and expose illegal behavior.63 Just as
some lies by private speakers may be thought harmless or even helpful, so too may
some lies by the government strike us as relatively innocuous or even valuable if they
help accomplish important public objectives.64 Along these lines, many thinkers urge
more generally that lies motivated by the speaker’s interest in preventing harm to the

agency silence about the violated conditions.”).
61. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that “[t]he dangers of suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, as
here, the regulations concern false statements about easily verifiable facts”); Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 277–82 (holding that the failure to require a showing of a speaker’s malice as an element of
a defamation claim brought by a public official may chill valuable speech).
62. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976) (“[C]ommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. Attributes such as these, the greater
objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.” (emphasis in original)).
63. See
Fair
Housing
Testing
Program,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/fair-housing-testing-program-1 (last updated Aug. 6, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/8GMK-H6HS] (describing the Department of Justice’s Fair Housing Testing
Program, in which “individuals who, without any bona fide intent to rent or purchase a home,
apartment, or other dwelling, pose as prospective buyers or renters of real estate” to determine
whether housing providers are complying with fair housing laws).
64. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“False factual
statements can serve useful human objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they may
prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with
comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or
otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and
scientific contexts, where (as Socrates’ methods suggest) examination of a false statement
(even if made deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps
realize the truth.”).
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listener (or others) are morally as well as instrumentally justifiable.65 John
Mearsheimer is among those who see considerable benefit to certain strategically
motivated government lies, such as those told to protect national security interests.66
Kennedy administration Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester even
proposed a governmental duty to lie in certain related circumstances:
Government officials as individuals do not have the right to lie
politically or to protect themselves, but they do always have the duty to
protect their countrymen. . . . Sometimes, and those times are rare indeed,
Government officials may be required to fulfill their duty by issuing a
false statement to deceive a potential enemy, as in the Cuban missile
crisis.67
For these reasons, we may resist constraints on the government’s lies that are
motivated by certain public-minded purposes.
These concerns may be addressed by treating the government’s motive for lying
as key to its decision’s ultimate legality. As discussed in more detail in Part IV,
government lies that trigger strict constitutional scrutiny because they deprive their
target of protected rights should fail this scrutiny when motivated by nonpublic (and
thus noncompelling) reasons—for example, when the government has lied to protect
itself from legal or political accountability, for its financial gain, or to silence or
punish a critic’s protected expression. But the government’s decision should survive
such scrutiny when necessary to achieve compelling government interests—for
example, to calm public panic in a public safety emergency or to prevent a criminal
from hurting a victim.68
In sum, the government’s lies pose substantial dangers, as do efforts to prohibit
them. Empowering government to protect us and our interests while limiting its
ability to hurt us is no easy task, requiring care and attention to nuance. Wrestling

65. See BOK, supra note 19, at 78 (“Just as lies intended to avoid serious harm have often
been thought more clearly excusable than others, so lies meant to do harm are often thought
least excusable. And lies which neither avoid nor cause harm occupy the middle ground.
Throughout the centuries, beginning with Augustine, such distinctions have been debated,
refined, altered.” (emphasis in original)); Strauss, supra note 12, at 355 (“[T]here is a
difference between lies that are manipulative and false statements made for different reasons.
False statements that are not manipulative lack the element of control and domination. An
inadvertently false statement, for example, or a false statement made solely for the purpose of
protecting a confidence, is less objectionable because it does not involve the same degree of
manipulation as a false statement made for the purpose of influencing behavior or thought.”).
66. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 7; see also ALTERMAN, supra note 3, at 39 (“Lying
about peaceful negotiations during wartime is a categorically different act than lying about
warlike acts in peacetime, and far less troubling. Successful military operations often require
secrecy and sometimes even deception.”).
67. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 14; see also MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 7 (“But the
fact is that there are good strategic reasons for leaders to lie to their publics as well as to other
countries. These practical logics almost always override well-known and widely accepted
moral strictures against lying. Indeed, leaders sometimes think that they have a moral duty to
lie to protect their country.”).
68. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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with the problem of government lies thus requires us to recognize, and seek to
accommodate, these tensions. The next Part explores possible constitutional
approaches to constraining government’s deliberate falsehoods that attend to these
competing concerns.
II. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT LIES
As the preceding Part described, the government’s lies threaten a range of serious
harms. That government behaves badly, however, does not necessarily mean that it
behaves unconstitutionally. This Part thus seeks to identify when and how the
government’s lies inflict the harms of deception and breach of trust in ways that
endanger specific constitutional rights.69 More specifically, it explores possibilities
for building on due process and free speech theory and doctrine to address harms to
targeted individuals while remaining attentive to the enforcement challenges
described above.
A. The Due Process Clause
In this subpart, I propose that government lies violate the Due Process Clause
when they directly deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property or when they are
sufficiently coercive of their targets to constitute the functional equivalent of such
deprivations. In other words, sometimes the government’s lies inflict the harms of
deception in ways that injure their target’s protected liberty or property interests in
legally cognizable ways. I further propose that even noncoercive government lies
may violate the Due Process Clause in those extreme circumstances when they lack
any reasonable justification—that is, when they shock the conscience with their
outrageousness and thus constitute an abuse of governmental power. In other words,
government lies that breach the public’s trust that its government’s actions will not
be mean-spirited or cruel can also violate substantive due process protections.70

69. Although this Article focuses on the Due Process Clause and Free Speech Clause as
the most promising sources of constitutional constraint on government lies, other possibilities
remain. For example, Article II imposes upon the President an affirmative duty to speak that
might be interpreted to include a duty to speak truthfully in that context. See Vasan Kesavan
& J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25 (2002)
(interpreting Article II to require the President’s report on the state of the union to include
“detailed reporting on the public affairs of the United States so that Congress may properly
exercise its legislative power”); id. at 63–64 (“The publication of the President’s assessment
conveys information to Congress—information uniquely gleaned from the President’s
perspective in her various roles as Commander-in-Chief, chief law enforcer, negotiator with
foreign powers, and the like—that shall aid the legislature in public deliberation . . . .”).
Government lies designed to manipulate election results might also be understood to offend a
commitment to a republican form of government in violation of the Guarantee Clause. See
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”). The Supreme Court, however, has long held that
Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions. E.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849).
70. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (explaining that substantive due
process protects against the arbitrary exercise of government power and thus “bar[s] certain
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First, courts have already identified a few specific situations where the link
between a government lie and the denial of constitutionally protected liberty is
sufficiently strong to violate the Due Process Clause. As we know, the Constitution
protects persons from governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.71 More specifically, government lies can violate procedural due
process protections when they deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without
adequate procedural safeguards, and they can violate substantive due process
protections regardless of the presence of procedural safeguards when they deprive
individuals of life, liberty, or property without adequate government justification.72
For example, prosecutorial lies to a judge or jury can offend due process protections
when they lead to a defendant’s conviction and thus the deprivation of her individual
physical liberty.73 Other government lies that falsely assert an individual’s
misconduct or dangerousness can deprive their targets of liberty in other very direct
ways. Imagine, for example, a government’s lie that an individual is sufficiently
dangerous to be included on a “no-fly” list and thus barred from international air
travel.74
The scope of such protections, of course, turns in great part on how broadly one
defines protected liberty and property interests for purposes of the Due Process
Clause. The examples identified in the preceding paragraph involve lies that are
directly connected to what all agree are constitutionally protected interests in
physical liberty. But other situations trigger considerably more controversy.
Consider, for example, whether the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to
constrain government’s defamatory lies75: although the causal connection between
the government lie and damage to reputation is apparent, whether reputation itself is
a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest remains contested.
The Supreme Court considered this question in Paul v. Davis, where it rejected a
procedural due process challenge to a local police department’s creation and
distribution of a flyer that identified the challenger as one of several

government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them”).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.
72. For a discussion of procedural and substantive due process principles more generally,
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 545–46.
73. See supra note 28 (listing examples).
74. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1139 (D. Or. 2014) (noting conclusion
in earlier order that plaintiffs had “protected liberty interests in their rights to travel
internationally by air and rights to be free from false governmental stigmatization that were
affected by their inclusion on the No-Fly List” and concluding that government’s failure to
provide plaintiffs with post-deprivation notice or any meaningful opportunity to contest their
inclusion on the no-fly list violated procedural due process protections); Aaron H. Caplan,
Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (“Persons appearing on a
blacklist [like the “no-fly” list] are not treated as suspected wrongdoers, but as confirmed
wrongdoers who face consequences as a result. Yet these consequences are imposed without
the procedures the U.S. Constitution ordinarily relies on to ensure that wrongdoers are
correctly identified and punishment appropriately imposed.”).
75. For purposes of this discussion, I focus only on a subset of defamation—that is,
defamatory lies—while recognizing that speech can sometimes constitute defamation if
recklessly or negligently, and not only deliberately, false.
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“Active Shoplifters,”76 even though the pending shoplifting charges against him had
not been proven and were later dismissed.77 A divided Court held that government
defamation does not trigger procedural due process protections (i.e., a name-clearing
hearing) unless it causes some harm—like job loss or other economic injury—in
addition to stigmatic injury.78 In dissent, Justice Brennan objected vigorously to the
majority’s narrow understanding of the harm to liberty interests necessary to trigger
procedural due process review and concluded that the “logical and disturbing
corollary of this holding is that no due process infirmities would inhere in a statute
constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of individuals, so long as the
only official judgment pronounced was limited to the public condemnation and
branding of a person . . . .”79
The Court’s decision in Paul continues to attract criticism from those who would
find both procedural and substantive Due Process Clause protections triggered by
defamatory government lies that cause reputational damage alone.80 Barbara
Armacost, for example, characterizes the Court’s holding as ignoring the unique
reputational harms of government defamation, especially in the criminal context:
“[B]ecause governmental officials have a virtual monopoly on criminal enforcement,
the power to cause this kind of reputational harm is uniquely governmental. . . . The
words and actions of police officers and prosecutors are viewed as official
declarations of the law enforcement arms of government.”81 She describes the
government’s defamatory assertion that an individual has engaged in criminal
conduct as akin to an adjudication that should thus trigger procedural due process
protections.82

76. See 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976).
77. Id. at 696.
78. Id. at 712 (holding that the government’s “defamatory publications, however
seriously they may have harmed respondent’s reputation, did not deprive him of any ‘liberty’
or ‘property’ interests protected by the Due Process Clause”).
79. Id. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (italics in original).
80. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as
Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 102, 142 (2009) (arguing that reputation should be
protected as liberty for procedural due process purposes, especially in light of states’ growing
ability to label citizens as “potential terrorists, gang members, sex offenders, child abusers,
and prostitution patrons”); Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983:
The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 238–39 (1977) (urging a procedural due
process analysis that addresses government defamation motivated by the government’s intent
to stigmatize the target); Shaudee Navid, Comment, They’re Making a List, but Are They
Checking It Twice? How Erroneous Placement on Child Offender Databases Offends
Procedural Due Process, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1641, 1667–74 (2011) (describing circuit
split as to whether the government’s erroneous listing of the plaintiff in a child offender
database deprives him of a liberty interest and suggesting procedural cure with a system that
permits timely correction of erroneous listings).
81. Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA.
L. REV. 569, 621–22 (1999).
82. Id. at 625 (“The distinction between statements that brand or accuse and those that
simply report law enforcement actions would serve as a sensible limiting principle for the due
process cause of action for governmental defamation.”).
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Still others argue that government damage to reputation through defamatory lies
infringes upon fundamental liberty or property interests in violation of substantive
due process protections.83 The Court itself has explicitly declined to foreclose this
possibility.84 Under this approach, regardless of the adequacy of any procedural
protections, the government’s defamatory lies can violate the Due Process Clause
when they lack an adequate justification.
Consider next the possibility that the government’s lies that coerce its target into
giving up protected liberties violate due process protections because they are
functionally equivalent to directly depriving the target of those rights. Courts and
commentators have extensively examined this possibility in the context of law
enforcement officers’ lies.85 More specifically, when assessing whether police
interrogators’ lies deprive their targets of constitutionally protected liberties, the
Court seeks to determine whether the lies take the form of “coercion, not mere
strategic deception,” such that they render a confession (or other decision to waive a
constitutional right) involuntary.86

83. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555,
590–607 (1997) (arguing that government defamation should be understood as infringing a
fundamental property interest in reputation and thus triggering strict scrutiny as a matter of
substantive due process).
84. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711 n.5 (“Our discussion in Part III is limited to consideration of
the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and is not intended to describe those
substantive limitations upon state action which may be encompassed within the concept of
‘liberty’ expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Recently, the Court suggested that
substantive due process guarantees might apply to the government’s defamatory lies. See
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“I join the
Court’s opinion and agree with the observation that today’s holding does not foreclose a claim
that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due
process principle. To the extent that libel might be at least a component of such a claim, our
reference to Connecticut’s disclaimer would not stand in the way of a substantive due process
plaintiff.” (citation omitted)).
85. See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1174 (2001) (“Interrogation typically requires at least some
deception—from professing unfelt sympathy for the suspect, to exaggerating the strength of
the evidence against the suspect, to falsely alleging that a witness has identified the suspect.”).
Although such interrogation lies can offer considerable benefits in uncovering, punishing, and
preventing wrongdoing and protecting public safety, they also threaten significant harm
through wrongful convictions and decreased public trust. Debate abounds on the comparative
costs and benefits of police lies. Compare id. at 1171–72 (urging that limiting police deception
would impose significant societal harm by reducing the number of convictions of the guilty),
and William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903,
1907 (1993) (“[G]uilty criminal defendants would benefit substantially if the law were to
prohibit deceptive tactics, while innocents would probably be harmed by the impairment of
the government’s ability to sort cases.”), with Young, supra note 23 (arguing that police lies
are unacceptably harmful), and Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the
Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices in the United States, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1029, 1032 (2009) (“Confessions gained through police deception are often
factually inaccurate and untrustworthy.”).
86. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (finding no constitutional violation
when an undercover law enforcement officer posed as a fellow inmate to whom a jailed suspect
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This focus on coercion seeks to protect individuals’ liberty to decide freely
whether to waive a constitutional right (such as the right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination, the right to a lawyer, or the right to be free from warrantless
searches) while also declining to characterize all police lies as rising to the level of a
constitutional violation.87 Here the hard questions center on the causal connection
between the lie and a constitutionally protected liberty—that is, whether and when
the government’s lie is sufficiently coercive such that it effectively deprives an
individual of that right. In assessing whether law enforcement officers’ lies are
impermissibly coercive, courts often try to determine whether their target could
reasonably be expected to resist them with silence rather than with an incriminating
response or other waiver of a constitutional right. Along these lines, Christopher
Slobogin has synthesized the case law to identify two types of interrogation lies as
“clearly illegitimately coercive.”88 First, police lies about the target’s constitutional
rights coerce the waiver of such rights and thus violate constitutional protections.89
In other words, the government’s lies about the existence of, or the consequences of
exercising, constitutional rights can be the practical equivalent of its refusal to honor
those rights altogether. Second, courts often characterize lies as coercive if they
would be coercive if true—that is, if a reasonable person would likely waive a
constitutional right in response.90 Examples of such lies include false threats to take
a suspect’s child away or false threats to cut off government financial aid to a
suspect’s child unless the suspect waived her rights,91 and false claims that doctors
trying to save a child’s life needed a suspect’s explanation of the circumstances under
which he injured the child.92 Such lies’ coercive potential may vary with the audience
as well as with subject matter and other contextual factors: for example, a number of
commentators assert that teenagers’ youth and inexperience leaves them especially
vulnerable to police interrogation tactics that include lies.93

made damaging admissions); id. at 297 (“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic
deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow
prisoner.”); United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998) (“But trickery is not
automatically coercion. Indeed, the police commonly engage in such ruses as suggesting to a
suspect that a confederate has just confessed or that police have or will secure physical
evidence against the suspect. While the line between ruse and coercion is sometimes blurred,
confessions procured by deceits have been held voluntary in a number of situations.”); see
also GREEN, supra note 27, at 93–95 (distinguishing the harms of coercion and deception as
different ways to bend another’s will against her own preferences—the first through force or
power and the second through the manipulation of information).
87. Many commentators have addressed more generally how courts fashion constitutional
law doctrine to accommodate the institutional realities of various government actors. See, e.g.,
Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J.
422 (2012); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190
(1988).
88. Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1275, 1276
(2007).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
92. See People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 314–15 (N.Y. 2014).
93. See Hayley M. D. Cleary, Police Interviewing and Interrogation of Juvenile Suspects:
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In contrast, examples of law enforcement officers’ lies that courts generally
characterize as noncoercive include police lies about the strength of their case (e.g.,
whether a codefendant has confessed or whether there’s a witness), lies about the
existence of physical evidence, lies about the comparative blameworthiness of the
defendant’s or the victim’s conduct, lies about the circumstances of the interrogation
(e.g., the identity of the interrogator or the results of a polygraph test), and lies by
undercover officers about their identities in noncustodial settings.94 Here courts
generally find such lies noncoercive because they believe a reasonable person could
resist them simply by remaining silent or otherwise declining to waive a
constitutional right. Civil rights testers’ intentional misrepresentations about their
interest in buying or renting specific property to determine whether housing
providers are complying with fair housing laws should similarly be characterized as
noncoercive, as the target is free to respond (or not to respond) in any of a variety of
ways (other than waiving constitutional rights).95
Courts’ assessments of the constitutionality of police lies to secure consent to
search without a warrant similarly turn on whether they find the lie to be coercive.96
The Supreme Court, for example, has found a suspect’s consent to be involuntary
when given in response to law enforcement officers’ intentionally false claim that
they had a warrant.97 In contrast, the Court has held that an undercover officer’s lie
about his identity did not render involuntary the suspect’s invitation of that
undercover agent into his home for a drug sale.98
To be sure, the line between coercive lies and those that are instead “merely”
deceptive is far from bright. Just as philosophers have long disagreed over the
meaning of coercion, so too have courts and legal commentators.99 Justices Marshall

A Descriptive Examination of Actual Cases, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2014)
(documenting ways in which teenagers may be particularly vulnerable to police coercion due
to their youth and inexperience); Errol C. Dauis, Note, Police Trickery and Juvenile Suspects:
People v. Mays, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 205 (2011) (arguing that juveniles are
especially vulnerable to police coercion because of their youth and inexperience); Patrick M.
McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception
in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 975–76 (2005) (proposing bright-line
ban on police deception when interrogating juveniles in light of juveniles’ greater vulnerability
to coercion, greater deference to authority, and limited ability to assess consequences).
94. Young, supra note 23, at 429–33.
95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
96. William E. Underwood, Note, A Little White Lie: The Dangers of Allowing Police
Officers to Stretch the Truth As a Means to Gain a Suspect’s Consent to Search, 18 WASH. &
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 167 (2011) (describing police lies about the reasons for a search
when requesting consent to search without a warrant); id. at 177 (explaining that consents to
searches must be free of coercion to be voluntary within meaning of Fourth Amendment).
97. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (finding that consent to search
was not voluntary when given in response to law enforcement officers’ false claim that they
had a warrant).
98. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
99. See J. Roland Pennock, Coercion: An Overview, in COERCION 1 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (describing philosophers’ debates over the definition of
coercion). The Supreme Court itself has defined coercion differently in different settings, and
is considerably quicker to find government’s actions to be coercive in some areas than in
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and Stevens, for example, are among those to have urged the Court to recognize a
substantially broader range of police lies as unconstitutionally coercive. More
specifically, Justice Marshall vigorously contested the Court’s refusal to characterize
as coercive an undercover officer’s lies to a suspect in custody; he urged that any
custodial questioning is inherently coercive, regardless of whether the target
perceives the questioner as the police.100 Justice Stevens similarly objected to the
Court’s refusal to characterize as coercive law enforcement officers’ deliberately
false assurances to an attorney that they were not questioning his client; he argued
that such lies are the functional equivalent of refusing to allow a suspect to consult
with his attorney in violation of the right to counsel.101 Various state and federal
courts have also developed different measures of coercion when assessing the
constitutionality of police lies.102
One could thus plausibly argue that a focus on coercion as a touchstone for due
process analysis lacks conceptual coherence or normative appeal or both,103 as it not
only invites contested determinations of whether a government lie is coercive but also
may fail to capture the full range of ways in which even noncoercive government lies
can nonetheless inflict harm.104 But the conceptually coherent alternatives—that is,
that we should interpret the Constitution to prohibit all of the government’s lies, or
none—are even less appealing from a normative standpoint: they either punish
harmless and even beneficial government lies, or they insulate some deeply damaging
government lies from constraint. Here I do not seek to resolve the limitations of
coercion-based analysis; instead I simply propose that government lies in certain
contexts can coerce their targets in ways that we should recognize as depriving
individuals of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. As we have seen, the
challenges posed by the government’s lies demand attention to context; attention to
context, in turn, requires us to tolerate—and perhaps even embrace—some
indeterminacy.105 For these reasons, I suggest that coercion provides a helpful, if

others. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012)
(describing federal government’s “threats to terminate other significant independent grants”
as coercive of state policy); id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no such coercion);
see also infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (discussing Justices’ differing approaches
to coercion in the context of Establishment Clause analysis).
100. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 306 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
compulsion proscribed by Miranda includes deception by the police.”).
101. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 450–56 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. See Young, supra note 23, at 453–56.
103. See Pierre Schlag, The Legal Argument Toolkit 13–18 (Jan. 1, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (identifying conceptual intelligibility and
normative appeal as among the criteria for “sound” legal distinctions). As Schlag points out,
these criteria stand in some tension with each other, which makes ideal legal distinctions
elusive. Id. at 19–20.
104. See Young, supra note 23, at 456–71 (arguing that even noncoercive lies by police
pose unacceptable harms to their ability to gather evidence and to their integrity).
105. See Schlag, supra note 103, at 34–35 (observing that indeterminacy has a number of
virtues, including maintaining flexibility, accommodating future change, postponing decision
making, and deferring to other decision makers). In a related context, Toni Massaro has
extolled the virtues of constitutional thinking “that is factored, not formulaic; contextual, not
trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; tentative, not absolutist; plural, not singular.” Toni M.
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imperfect, touchstone for identifying the universe of government lies that we should
understand to violate the Due Process Clause.
We can build upon this analysis to identify circumstances outside of the law
enforcement context in which government lies may operate coercively to deprive
individuals of constitutionally protected rights. For example, some government lies
about voting matters can violate the Due Process Clause.106 More specifically, the
government’s lies about the location of polls or the times at which they close can
deprive individuals of the meaningful exercise of voting rights. So too may be the
case of the government’s lies about candidates’ identity or party affiliation.107
As another example, the Supreme Court has suggested that laws subjecting
women seeking abortions to the government’s inaccurate or misleading speech about
abortion—presumably including, but not limited to, government lies about the legal
or health consequences of abortion—can pose an impermissible undue burden to a
woman’s reproductive rights.108 Although to date courts’ discussion of this
possibility has been very cursory, we might understand such lies as coercive of
women’s reproductive choices. Indeed, the Court has suggested in other contexts that
women seeking abortions at health care facilities can be considered “‘captive’ by
medical circumstance[s]” (i.e., with limited possibilities for exit or rebuttal)109—a
dynamic that increases the potential for coercion. The coercive effects of such lies
may also increase if the government requires that they be uttered by health care
providers upon whom patients rely for trusted and expert advice.110 Again, listeners’

Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 367 (2014).
106. See Caruso v. Yamhill Cnty., 422 F.3d 848, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2005) (raising the
possibility that false ballot speech could violate the Due Process Clause while finding that the
contested ballot speech was not misleading); McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections,
65 F.3d 1215, 1227 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
107. See Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098, 1102–03 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding possible due
process violation when state election officials issued ballot that intentionally misidentified a
sham candidate as the nominee, when the sham candidate quickly resigned and was replaced
by government officials’ preferred candidate).
108. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (“If the
information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D.,
S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 898–99 (8th Cir. 2012) (debating whether government-required
statements that women who obtain abortions experience increased risk of suicide and suicide
ideation were truthful and not misleading and thus consistent with substantive due process).
109. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (“[W]hile
targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being of the ‘captive’ resident,
targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the
physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance.”). For related
discussion, see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 941 (2009); Nadia N. Sawicki, Compelling Images: The
Constitutionality of Emotionally Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458, 516–20
(2014).
110. As a number of commentators have observed, patients might well misunderstand
health care professionals to be offering their own independent counsel rather than speaking
from the government’s required script. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE
L.J. 151, 172–75 (1996) (arguing that patients could mistakenly attribute the government’s
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ability to resist, and thus lies’ potential to coerce, varies with audience and setting,
and some government lies in such circumstances should be considered sufficiently
coercive of liberty to violate the Due Process Clause.
Consider finally the possibility that, under certain extreme circumstances, even
non-coercive lies by the government may violate substantive due process protections
against especially outrageous exercises of governmental power.111 As the Court has
explained, “Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have
understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary action . . . . [i.e.,]
the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a
legitimate governmental objective . . . .”112 As its test for determining whether
executive branch action violates such substantive due process protections, the Court
has considered whether “the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”113 The
government’s motive is key to this inquiry: “[C]onduct intended to injure in some
way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely
to rise to the conscience-shocking level.”114 Also relevant to this determination is “an
understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the
standards of blame generally applied to them.”115
The shocks-the-conscience test thus seeks to capture our expectations—enforceable
as a constitutional matter under the Due Process Clause—that our government should
not behave outrageously in its dealings with us. This expectation can be frustrated by
government lies (or other conduct) that reflects unusually culpable exercises of
government power. For example, while declining to find that police officers’ deliberate
falsehoods to a suspect’s attorney about their plans to question his client shocked the
conscience in violation of due process, the Court nonetheless noted: “We do not
question that on facts more egregious than those presented here police deception might
rise to a level of a due process violation.”116
To date, however, courts have very rarely applied the shocks-the-conscience test
of government outrageousness to constrain government action of any sort—and even
then most often to constrain physical abuse by law enforcement officers117 rather
than their lies.118 On the one hand, the test’s subjectivity has triggered its share of

views to their doctors).
111. I am grateful to Toni Massaro for this suggestion.
112. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).
113. Id. at 848 n.8; see also id. at 846 (“[F]or half a century now we have spoken of the
cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.”).
114. Id. at 849. In Lewis, the Court found that a police officer’s allegedly reckless high-speed
pursuit of two teens that resulted in one’s death did not shock the conscience because it was
spontaneous rather than deliberate and did not involve an intent to cause harm. Id. at 854–55.
115. Id. at 848 n.8.
116. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986).
117. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that sheriff’s
direction to hospital doctor to pump suspect’s stomach, against suspect’s will, to retrieve
evidence was sufficiently outrageous to violate substantive due process protections).
118. E.g., Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that police
officers’ lies to suspect that her lawyer had abandoned her did not shock the conscience);
Livsey v. Salt Lake Cnty., 275 F.3d 952, 957–58 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that police officer’s
misrepresentations of victim’s private sexual behavior did not shock the conscience); see also

98

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:73

criticism, and courts may thus be reluctant to invoke it.119 On the other hand, Jane
Bambauer and Toni Massaro, after extensively reviewing the history of the
shocks-the-conscience test, found that “the problems anticipated by critics are more
theoretical than actual” and concluded that the test is no more subjective than tort
law and that judges have been appropriately restrained in applying it.120
Indeed, courts not uncommonly assess the outrageousness of lies (and other
behavior) in other contexts—for example, in determining whether conduct satisfies
the outrageousness element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.121
In these other contexts, courts rely on a number of factors, considering not only the
liar’s malicious intent to injure, but also (and relatedly) whether she abused a position
of authority, whether her conduct was repeated rather than isolated, and whether she
knew her target to be especially vulnerable.122 Some lies by the government abuse

United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408–09 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he police can often mislead
suspects, at least where coercion is not involved; thus, it is impossible to treat all such false
statements as improper, let alone outrageous or uncivilized. Police investigation can be a rough
business, and untruths may sometimes be necessary to save a kidnap victim, retrieve a missing
firearm, or for other reasons quite apart from the desire to solve a specific crime already
committed.”).
119. See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing the
shocks-the-conscience test as the “ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi,
the Cellophane of subjectivity” (italics in original) (footnote omitted)); Eric L. Muller,
Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (2003) (“[The shocks-the-conscience
test] persists as a constitutional test without shape or content, and its critics mock it for its
subjectivity.”). For arguments that the shocks-the-conscience test is insufficiently restrictive
of governmental power, see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience
Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 308 (2010) (describing lower courts as having interpreted the test
“to impose a draconian standard, mandating, for example, that detainees demonstrate
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or that students prove intentional malice or sadism
in order to challenge excessive, unwarranted corporal punishment”).
120. Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583926 [http://perma.cc/K79F-7ZND]; see also Rochin, 342 U.S.
at 169 (“In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human rights, the absence
of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable
attribute of constitutional provisions.”); Bambauer & Massaro, supra, at 7 (“Too much
skepticism deprives us of a valuable judicial resource. We therefore advocate for (carefully)
increased use of outrageousness and irrationality scrutiny to allow liberty claims to develop
organically, cautiously, and contextually.”).
121. This tort has its critics as well. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51 (1982) (“The term ‘outrageous’ is neither
value-free nor exacting. It does not objectively describe an act or series of acts; rather, it
represents an evaluation of behavior. The concept thus fails to provide clear guidance either
to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who must evaluate that conduct.”).
122. See Kelly v. Gen. Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
supervisor’s false claims that former employee misused company funds and falsified invoices
were outrageous); Turnage v. Kasper, 704 S.E.2d 842, 852–53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding
that false accusations that neighbor violated bond conditions, which resulted in neighbor’s
arrest, were outrageous); Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
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its power in ways that satisfy such tests of outrageousness. One federal court, for
example, found that law enforcement conduct shocked the conscience when police,
among other things, misrepresented that they had a warrant to extract drugs
involuntarily from a suspect’s vagina such that she then extracted them herself.123
And three Ninth Circuit judges recently urged in dissent that law enforcement
officers’ lies rose to the level of outrageousness when they recruited random targets
to commit a fictional crime (robbing a drug house that did not exist) for which the
targets were prosecuted and convicted.124
In sum, some government lies inflict the harms of deception in ways that endanger
specific individual liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. Examples include
prosecutors’ lies to judges and juries that lead to a defendant’s imprisonment; law
enforcement officers’ lies that coerce the involuntary waiver of constitutional rights;
and government lies that deprive their targets of the ability meaningfully to exercise
voting, reproductive, or other protected liberties. Some government lies can also
violate the Due Process Clause by breaching the public’s trust that its government
will not behave outrageously; examples include the government’s lies that lack any
reasonable justification—that is, that shock our conscience—and thus constitute an
abuse of governmental power.
B. The Free Speech Clause
This subpart explores when, if ever, the government’s lies sufficiently injure First
Amendment interests to justify a departure from the general rule that the
government’s own speech is insulated from Free Speech Clause review. The
Supreme Court has recognized a “government speech” defense to certain Free
Speech Clause claims, holding that private speakers generally have no First
Amendment right to silence or alter the government’s own expression.125 The Court’s

(holding that false accusations of battery to gain leverage in child custody proceedings could
support a finding of outrageousness); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d, cmt. e
(1965) (identifying, as examples of outrageous conduct, lies that the target’s husband had been
seriously injured and lies that one is a police officer to coerce the target’s behavior).
123. United States v. Anderson, No. 5:13-cr-24, 2013 WL 5769976, at *12 (D. Vt. Oct. 24,
2013), rev’d on other grounds, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014).
124. See United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (“While trolling in a bar, the paid CI [confidential informant] successfully tempted
a randomly-selected person to participate in the (fictional) crime by offering him the
opportunity to obtain a huge financial benefit. After the CI put the participant in touch with
the government agent, the agent urged the participant to bring others into the plot, played the
principal role in devising and executing the imaginary crime, and then walked the defendants
through a script that ensured lengthy prison sentences for committing a crime that did not
exist.”); United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 318 (9th Cir. 2013) (Noonan, J., dissenting)
(“Massively involved in the manufacture of the crime, the ATF’s actions constitute conduct
disgraceful to the federal government. It is not a function of our government to entice into
criminal activity unsuspecting people engaged in lawful conduct; not a function to invent a
fiction in order to bait a trap for the innocent; not a function to collect conspirators to carry
out a script written by the government.”).
125. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (explaining that the
government’s own speech is exempt from Free Speech Clause scrutiny); see also Pleasant
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recognition of the government speech defense provides not that government has a
First Amendment right, but instead a privilege, to its own speech.126 In recognizing
such a defense, however, the Court so far has emphasized the ubiquity and
importance of the government’s expression without yet addressing its potential
threats to constitutional values; the only exception to date, as discussed below, is the
Court’s willingness to interpret the Establishment Clause to constrain government’s
religious speech under some circumstances.127 This subpart thus considers whether
and when some government lies are sufficiently coercive of their targets’ beliefs or
speech to constitute the functional equivalent of the government’s direct regulation
of those expressive choices in violation of the Free Speech Clause.
The government’s deliberately false speech can undermine key First Amendment
values in furthering participation in democratic self-governance, facilitating the
exercise of individual autonomy, and fostering the discovery of truth and the
dissemination of knowledge.128 First, many government lies frustrate democratic
self-governance.129 The Supreme Court has noted that political lies by private

Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“If [public entities] were engaging in their
own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”).
126. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (“A right is one’s affirmative claim against
another, and a privilege is one’s freedom from the right or claim of another.”); Frederick
Schauer, Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 914 (2008) (“Existing First
Amendment doctrine takes a rather clear position with respect to the Hohfeldian structure: a
First Amendment right is a right against the government and only against the government.”).
127. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment
Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2010) (“[A] large
proportion of all Establishment Clause jurisprudence could be thought of as involving claims
about government religious speech, with the other broad category relating to government
aid.”). A number of commentators have investigated the potential harms of government speech
in other contexts and have proposed various approaches for addressing those concerns. See,
e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling
Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion,
Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005); Helen Norton, The
Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008);
Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013).
128. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012) (summarizing and describing
the three major proposed purposes of the First Amendment as “cognitive” (“‘advancing
knowledge and discovering truth’” (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970))); “ethical” (furthering individual autonomy and self-fulfillment); and
“political” (“facilitating the communicative processes necessary for successful democratic
self-governance”)); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (describing the key values underlying the First Amendment’s
protection of speech to include furthering democratic self-governance, enabling the exercise
of individual autonomy, and facilitating the discovery of truth and the dissemination of
knowledge).
129. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
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speakers can offend such a Meiklejohnian view of the Free Speech Clause;130 lies by
the government carry even greater potential to undermine this interest. Consider, for
example, a government’s lies that hide its wrongdoing and thus stymie the public’s
ability to hold elected officials politically accountable for their misconduct, or that
deliberately manipulate policymakers’—and the public’s—assessments of competing
policy options.131 Moreover, government lies pose especially grave instrumental
threats to democratic self-governance in contexts where such deliberate falsehoods are
unlikely to be addressed by counterspeech, as can be the case with government lies
about information to which it has near-monopoly access, such as national security and
intelligence matters.132 Just as a government’s criminal sanction or economic reprisal
intended to punish or silence those who seek to expose its wrongdoing clearly
undermine democratic self-governance, so too can be the case of government lies
designed to prevent or deter such exposure.
Second, some lies by the government seek to manipulate individual listeners’
beliefs and decisions in ways that undermine those listeners’ autonomy and dignity.
As Jonathan Varat, for example, explains, “[T]he most powerful argument in favor
of government authority to restrict deception, and the most powerful argument
against government-imposed deception, are the same: the manipulative,
domineering, and fundamentally disrespectful invasion of autonomy worked by
deception.”133 Just as government laws that require or prohibit certain beliefs

24–25 (1948) (characterizing expression as furthering First Amendment values when it
contributes to democratic self-governance); id. at 27 (“It is that mutilation of the thinking
process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.”
(emphasis omitted)).
130. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“That speech is used as a tool for
political ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution.
For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to
be effected.”).
131. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 93 (“[W]henever leaders cannot sell a policy to
their public in a rational-legal manner, there is a good chance that the problem is with the
policy, not the audience.”); Spottswood, supra note 20, at 1253 (“Insincere assertions do not
further our interest in governing ourselves through a free and open exchange of information
and ideas, because they involve the betrayal of the public interest, not argument made in
service of it.”); Strauss, supra note 12, at 358 (“[F]alse statements by the government . . . can
seriously hamper the discussion necessary for democratic self-government that, according to
the Meiklejohn theory, the first amendment was designed to protect.”).
132. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 444 (“[President Bush] and his top officials relied on
controlled information release in a number of ways to support their use of force advocacy.
That they withheld much information within their control meant that they could rely upon the
public’s knowledge that they had superior access to the entire body of existing information to
characterize the facts with greater certainty than the content of the information reflected, to
omit mention of dissent, to suggest that they had more and better quality information than they
presented, and to ask the public to embrace the truth of the threat claims based on trust rather
than proof.”).
133. Varat, supra note 12, at 1110; see also Strauss, supra note 12, at 358 (“[W]hen the
government makes false statements or fails to disclose information for the purpose of
manipulating its own citizens, its conduct is wrong . . . .”); id. at 358 n.67 (“It might be thought
that the reason the courts do not enforce a prohibition against government lying is that the
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undermine individual autonomy, so too may be the case of government lies that
manipulate their listeners into adopting beliefs or expression of the government’s
choice. Such government lies can be especially effective in manipulating listeners
when directed to a vulnerable or captive audience where neither exit nor rebuttal is a
meaningful option, as can be the case of government lies to those in custody or to
young children in public schools.134
Third, government lies can frustrate the search for truth and the dissemination of
knowledge.135 Again, this may be especially true with respect to scientific or national
security matters where the government has unusual expertise or selective access to
the information in question, thus limiting meaningful opportunities for
counterspeech.136 Just as government efforts to prohibit the expression of certain
views contrary to its own can undermine First Amendment enlightenment values, so
too can be the case of government lies that successfully distort public discussion of
a particular matter or viewpoint.
Government lies can thus deceive their targets in a number of ways that undermine
free speech values. Interpreting the Free Speech Clause actually to prohibit such lies,
however, requires some refinement of current doctrine, as courts and commentators
have yet to grapple with the specific question of whether and when such lies should
be understood to “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”137 In other words, government
lies raise challenging First Amendment problems in large part because they do not
involve the traditional exercise of state power (unlike, for example, statutes that
criminalize or otherwise penalize private parties’ speech).
Government lies that coerce expressive activity may constitute the sort of “hard
law” that generally triggers constitutional scrutiny.138 As discussed in the preceding

language of the first amendment does not authorize such a prohibition. But as a matter of
language it is not implausible to say that the government ‘abridg[es] the freedom of speech’
when it deliberately lies about a matter of great public concern for the purpose of preventing
a full public debate.” (alteration in original)).
134. See Jeffrey M. Cohen, The Right to Learn: Intellectual Honesty and the First
Amendment, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 659, 683 (2012) (urging that students have a First
Amendment right to learn that includes the right to “honest, deceit-free” compulsory
education).
135. Varat, supra note 12, at 1132 (“By its nature, government deception impairs the
enlightenment function of the First Amendment, limiting the citizenry’s capacity to check
government abuse and participate in self-governance to the maximum extent.”).
136. See Jess Alderman, Words to Live By: Public Health, the First Amendment, and
Government Speech, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 161, 164 (2009) (“Scientific information can be
particularly difficult for listeners to evaluate, so they will turn to sources they trust for
information. Because the government is empowered to regulate and promote health, can
expend vast resources, and has historically played a central role in the promotion of health,
government speech has a uniquely powerful influence on public health.”).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
138. A number of scholars focus on what they characterize as the presence or absence of
the government’s coercion to distinguish more generally between what they call “hard” and
“soft” law. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 129 (2015) (“[L]aw is coercive
to the extent that its sanctions provide motivations for people, because of the law, to do
something other than what they would have done absent the law; and . . . law can be said to
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subpart, government lies that coerce targets’ decisions about whether to exercise
constitutionally protected liberties are hard to distinguish from government actions
that deny those rights altogether, and thus as a functional matter can be understood
to deprive individual liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. This subpart
similarly proposes that we understand the Free Speech Clause to constrain the
government’s lies that are sufficiently coercive of expressive activity to be the
functional equivalent of regulating that expression directly. Along these lines, Toni
Massaro has urged that we understand government speech more generally to violate
the First Amendment when it “exerts so much expressive power that its actions are
tantamount to direct speech regulation.”139 Applying this suggestion specifically to
the government’s deliberate falsehoods, we can understand the government’s lies to
exert expressive power in this way when they coerce targets’ beliefs or expression.
Indeed, courts already consider the coercive potential of the government’s speech
when determining whether government has violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause. More specifically, courts sometimes find government’s
religious speech to violate the Establishment Clause when such expression coerces
its listeners’ choices.140 To be sure, divisions remain even among advocates of
coercion theory about whether and when government’s religious speech alone can
coerce behavior.141 Justice Kennedy, for example, has defined impermissible

exercise compulsion when its coercive force actually does induce the aforesaid shift in
behavior.”); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012) (“Hard
power is, quite simply, ‘the ability to coerce.’. . . Soft power, by contrast, is ‘the ability to get
what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.’” (quoting Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 256 (2004))); Jacob E.
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV.
573, 577 (2008) (defining “soft law” to include statements by lawmaking authorities that do
not have legally coercive status—that is, those statements “that do not have the force of law”).
To be sure, however, a number of thoughtful commentators contest such distinctions as
meaningless, instead urging that all government action is coercive. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471–74
(1923) (arguing that because private actors can assert coercive power just as government can,
government’s choice to leave certain matters to background law rather than to public
regulation simply creates opportunities for coercion by private actors; government, thus,
always distributes coercion in different ways rather than coercing or refraining from coercion).
139. Massaro, supra note 105, at 402 (emphasis omitted); see also Meese v. Keene, 481
U.S. 465, 490 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court takes an unjustifiably narrow
view of the sort of government action that can violate First Amendment protections. . . .
[T]here need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment
violation.”); id. at 490–91 (“The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully
capable of a coercive effect on speech, and that the First Amendment protections extend
beyond the blatant censorship the Court finds lacking here.” (citation omitted)).
140. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659–60 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[G]overnment may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise . . . . Forbidden involvements
include compelling or coercing participation or attendance at a religious activity, requiring
religious oaths to obtain government office or benefits, or delegating government power to
religious groups.” (citations omitted)).
141. See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 933, 941 (1986) (“A noncoercion standard, of course, would not answer all
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“coercion” to include government’s religious speech that changes onlookers’
behavior through peer pressure and other social dynamics; he found this to be the
case of a prayer at a public high school graduation that students felt pressure to
attend.142 Justice Scalia, in contrast, has defined impermissible “coercion” for
Establishment Clause purposes much more narrowly to include only the threat or
imposition of government punishment.143
However defined, coercion provides the touchstone for identifying unlawful lies
in other contexts as well. The Court, for example, has recognized that in certain
circumstances an employer’s on-the-job lie may violate federal labor law by
impermissibly coercing workers’ choices. More specifically, the Court held that an
employer’s false threats that employees would lose their jobs if they voted to
unionize were sufficiently coercive of its targets—economically vulnerable
workers—to be unprotected by the First Amendment (and thus regulable by the
National Labor Relations Act).144
We might similarly interpret the Free Speech Clause to prohibit the government’s
lies that coerce its targets’ beliefs, speech, or other expressive activity. Here too the
subject matter of the government’s lie, as well as its setting and audience, may shape
its coercive potential. As we have seen in the due process context, for example, the
government’s false threats (like true threats) are especially likely to coerce its targets’
choices.145 Along these lines, Beth Orsoff urges attention to context when assessing
the coercive potential of government threats in general:
[T]he test should be whether the average reasonable person receiving the
government criticism would perceive it as a threat, not whether the
government official can legitimately execute the threat. Furthermore, this
threat should not be narrowly construed only as a threat to prosecute. The
government can threaten an individual as effectively in much more subtle
ways. For example, threatening to audit an individual’s or business’ taxes
for the past seven years, refusing to issue or renew a permit, or even
hinting at a possible grand jury investigation could cause an individual
or company to change behavior just as effectively as a threat of
prosecution.146
Government lies other than false threats or false assertions of legal consequences
may also punish, deter, or otherwise coerce a reasonable target’s expressive

questions. For example, it obviously would not answer the question, ‘What is coercion?’
Enormous variance exists between the persecutions of old and the many subtle ways in which
government action can distort religious choice today.”).
142. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593–95 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) (concluding that prayers
by clergy at public high school graduations are inherently coercive given the pressure on
students to attend graduation and then not to leave during the prayers).
143. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty.” (emphasis in original)).
144. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
145. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
146. Orsoff, supra note 14, at 234 (footnote omitted).
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choices.147 Relatedly, then-professor Elena Kagan identified the government’s
motive to censor speech with which it disagrees as the key to identifying a First
Amendment violation and suggested that the First Amendment could be interpreted
to constrain government speech (including, presumably, government lies) with such
an improper motive.148 Examples might include the government’s efforts to retaliate
against or otherwise silence its critics through its lies about them that inflict
reputational or economic injury.149 Recall, for example, the FBI’s often-successful
efforts during the 1950s and 1960s to silence antiwar protestors and other dissenters
by spreading false information about them to friends, family members, and
employers.150 As we have seen, some commentators have suggested that
government’s expressive branding of a target as criminal is the functional equivalent
of punishment for Due Process Clause purposes;151 the same may also be true for
Free Speech Clause purposes.
As another set of possibilities, consider government lies that seek to manipulate
captive or otherwise vulnerable audiences in environments like schools or prisons
where neither counterspeech nor exit is a meaningful option for the targets.152

147. Of course, government speech other than lies—including, but not limited to, true
threats—may coerce their targets’ protected expression, and thus they too might violate the
Free Speech Clause.
148. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431–33 (1996).
149. See Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph,
J., concurring) (“I believe the First Amendment may well prohibit government officials from
spreading false, derogatory information in order to interfere with a publisher’s distribution of
protected material. While this might require an inquiry into the official’s motive, it is not
unusual for a First Amendment violation to turn on whether governmental conduct was
undertaken for the purpose of infringing on someone’s speech.”); SCHAUER, supra note 138,
at 133 (“[Government] shaming can be seen as just another weapon in law’s coercive
arsenal.”); see also Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (considering the possibility
that false government press release issued in retaliation for First Amendment activity may
violate the First Amendment, but concluding that the contested government press release was
not false).
150. STONE, supra note 3, at 490 (“In its effort to destabilize and incapacitate the left, FBI
agents wrote letters to employers to cause the firing of antiwar activists; distributed fraudulent
college newspapers defaming peace activists; sent anonymous letters to campaign contributors
and other supporters of antiwar candidates to sabotage their campaigns; mailed anonymous
letters to the spouses of antiwar activists, suggesting that their partners were having
extramarital affairs; and spread false rumors that individuals were embezzling funds or
secretly cooperating with the FBI.”).
151. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
152. See YUDOF, supra note 16, at 169 (“Perhaps a factor that should be taken into account
in determining the likelihood of government distortion of the thinking processes of citizens is
the degree to which the government has captured the audience.”); Martin H. Redish & Kevin
Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the
Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 99 (2002) (identifying free speech
concerns with respect to government speech in public schools that seeks to indoctrinate “a
captive audience of undeveloped and impressionable minds”); Brian C. Castello, Note, The
Voice of Government as an Abridgement of First Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking
Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE L.J. 654, 676–77 (1989) (“Government speech that forces a
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Government lies’ coercive potential may similarly increase with respect to matters
where the government is a particularly trusted authority, as can be the case where it
has monopoly access to the information underlying the lie.153
As discussed earlier, coercion analysis is not without its drawbacks.154 Again,
some may fear that it suffers from serious indeterminacy problems, as the line
identifying the point at which government lies coerce their targets’ expressive
choices remains less than bright. Just as is the case when determining when
government’s religious speech is sufficiently coercive of targets’ behavior to violate
the Establishment Clause or when a government lie is sufficiently coercive of its
target’s liberty to violate the Due Process Clause, so too is there room to debate when
the government’s lie is sufficiently coercive of its target’s expressive activity to
violate the Free Speech Clause. Again, I do not propose to solve the definitional
challenges of coercion here.155 Instead I simply urge that government lies may
sometimes coerce listeners’ beliefs or speech in ways that are hard to distinguish
from the government’s direct regulation of such expressive choices and thus should
be understood to violate the Free Speech Clause.
Others may wonder whether a focus on coercion is instead too narrow, in that it
fails to address the many ways in which the government’s lies can inflict expressive
harm even when they do not coerce their targets’ expressive activity.156 In the
Establishment Clause setting, for example, Justice O’Connor applied endorsement
(rather than coercion) analysis to find that the government violated a constitutional
commitment to religious pluralism when it delivered a message that citizens’ status
varies based on their religion (or nonreligion).157 Expressivist scholars might

captive audience to be subject to a particular viewpoint presents the clearest example of
coerced consent.”). For similar reasons, courts not infrequently consider government’s
religious speech in the public school setting as coercive for Establishment Clause purposes.
See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
153. See Massaro, supra note 105, at 402–03 (urging that we consider “the extent to which
government has monopoly power over the information in question” in determining whether
and when government speech is the functional equivalent of direct regulation of speech).
154. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
155. See id.; see also Massaro, supra note 105, at 407 (“Distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible government coercion requires nuance and a willingness to bend
speech principles to accommodate conflicting political, historical, and other regulatory
realities.”).
156. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,”
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993) (“An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material
consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is
just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution not only
because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they convey
demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values. On this unusual conception of
constitutional harm, when a governmental action expresses disrespect for such values, it can
violate the Constitution.” (emphasis in original)).
157. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“As a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures
the essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make
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similarly view government’s disparaging speech—including, presumably, its
defamatory lies—as inflicting a constitutional wrong regardless of any coercive
effect on targets’ expressive choices.158
But an expressivist approach is arguably even more indeterminate than one that
relies on coercion and thus may exacerbate concerns about separation of powers,
institutional competence, and chilling valuable government speech.159 By proposing
that we understand the First Amendment to prohibit those government lies that
coerce their targets’ expressive choices, I am suggesting an approach that is more
likely to satisfy standing doctrine’s requirement of particularized injury160 (and that
is arguably more manageable) while tolerating, as a constitutional matter, lies that
inflict significant if less tangible harms. This is no easy choice, and in so proposing
I do not mean to suggest that noncoercive government lies are unworthy of our
concern. To the contrary, some noncoercive lies by the government may still warrant
statutory or political redress even if they do not injure specific due process or free
speech interests.161 The next Part thus examines a range of nonconstitutional
approaches to the harms posed by certain government lies.
III. NONCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING GOVERNMENT LIES
Just as the preceding Part’s due process and free speech discussion relied heavily
on contextual analysis, this Part examines a variety of nonconstitutional alternatives

a person’s religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community by
conveying a message ‘that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’”
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment))).
158. Tebbe, supra note 127 (drawing from free speech and equal protection doctrine to
identify a constitutional theory prohibiting the government from engaging in certain
disparaging speech).
159. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 156, at 513–14 (“Yet, when courts recognize
expressive harms, this traditional requirement of individualized harm comes under
considerable pressure. Expressive harms focus on social perceptions, public understandings,
and messages; they involve the government’s symbolic endorsement of certain values in ways
not obviously tied to any discrete, individualized harm. A significant tension, therefore, exists
between recognition of expressive harms and traditional requirements of individualized
wrongs.” (emphasis in original)). Elsewhere I have explored the advantages and disadvantages
of coercion and expressivist analyses as applied to government’s hateful speech. Helen
Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 159, 198–208 (2012).
160. As a related example, courts have recognized certain circumstances where
government’s religious speech inflicts sufficiently concrete and particularized injuries upon
listeners to satisfy the requirements of standing and empower the federal courts to consider
Establishment Clause challenges to such speech. See David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm?
Nontaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071,
1075 (2011) (describing “two basic tests” among the courts of appeal: “The dominant
approach requires a plaintiff to show some version of direct and unwelcome contact with the
challenged symbol or display. A second approach requires a plaintiff to show that he altered
his behavior to avoid contact with the allegedly offensive display.” (footnote omitted)).
161. See infra notes 209–11 and accompanying text.
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for addressing government lies that occur in specific harm-threatening contexts. It
thus identifies a menu of possibilities that include statutory and political remedies
for addressing the government’s deliberate falsehoods to certain audiences, on
certain topics, by certain speakers, or in other settings that threaten especially serious
harm.
A. Statutory and Other Legal Constraints
In addition to (or instead of) constitutional approaches that require the development
of new doctrine, a variety of statutory options remain available to constrain certain
harmful government lies. Not only do legislatures as well as courts have a role to play
in protecting constitutional values,162 but tailored statutory alternatives can ease some
of the enforcement challenges described above by addressing government lies in
specific contexts that threaten especially grave harms.163 Such legislative efforts can
draw from or add to a number of statutes that already prohibit lies in specific contexts.
For example, some statutes prohibit certain lies in certain settings by speakers
generally, including but not limited to government speakers. Perjury law offers an
especially prominent illustration of a setting-specific approach, as it targets lies under
oath (by governmental and nongovernmental speakers alike) that are material to certain
high-stakes decisions.164 Other examples include laws that target dishonest or corrupt
behavior that includes (but is not limited to) lies, such as statutes that prohibit
obstruction of justice.165 Note that perjury and related laws criminalize lies that threaten
not only individualized and concrete harms to litigants when they deceive decision
makers and thus lead to erroneous verdicts,166 but also more collective harms to the
public’s trust in the integrity of the justice system.167

162. See Magarian, supra note 33, at 168–69 (“Congress as well as courts can safeguard
constitutional values. . . . Statutes have normative and practical advantages over the judicial
process because Congress is a politically accountable institution with the mandate and
resources to make difficult policy decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
163. Relatedly, Justice Breyer recommended that legislatures address the most harmful lies
by private speakers while remaining attentive to First Amendment concerns by crafting
narrowly tailored statutes that address specific harmful contexts. United States v. Alvarez, 132
S. Ct. 2537, 2556 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (recommending that a statute
require “a showing that the false statement caused specific harm or at least was material, or
focus its coverage on lies most likely to be harmful or on contexts where such lies are most
likely to cause harm”).
164. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); see also United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374,
376 (1953) (describing federal perjury law as prohibiting a “false statement wilfully made as
to facts material to the hearing” under an oath authorized by federal law and taken before a
competent tribunal, officer, or person).
165. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 185–86.
166. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 132 (“[Knowingly false evidence] attempts to distort, distract, and
mislead. At best, such evidence will waste time and effort in requiring energy to be devoted
to demonstrating that the testimony is false; at worst, the falsehood will not be revealed and
the jury will reach the wrong substantive result.”).
167. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546 (plurality opinion) (“Perjury undermines the function
and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal
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Other statutes target lies made to certain audiences. One example is the Federal
False Statements Act, which prohibits material falsity in communications with the
federal government.168 The Act criminalizes lies to the government (including but not
limited to those made by other government speakers) that are “predictably capable of
affecting” government decision making,169 without regard to whether the lies were
intended to obtain monetary gain or whether they caused any concrete harm to the
government.170 Examples of lies prohibited by the Act include not only lies that may
affect decisions to grant a government benefit or contract but also decisions about
whether and how to deploy the government’s investigative energies.171 The statute’s
reach thus includes lies that may pose collective harms to the public in terms of
depleted or diverted governmental resources.
Defamation law takes a harm-specific approach by targeting lies (and other speech
that may be defamatory even if not deliberately false) that damage individual
reputation. Although legislatures currently shield many government actors from
monetary liability for their defamatory lies with a variety of immunities,172 they need

system.”).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly
and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . or
both.”).
169. E.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) (explaining that a statement
is “material” if “predictably capable of affecting” a government decision).
170. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 412–13 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in judgment) (describing how the Act was originally interpreted to apply to lies intended to
defraud the federal government out of its property or money but was later amended to more
broadly prohibit deceptive communications that interfered with or obstructed lawful
government functions); United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 71 (1984) (same).
171. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (“The amendment indicated the
congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and
agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described.”);
Varat, supra note 12, at 1114–15 (“Lies in the course of official government proceedings risk
producing false beliefs in the minds of official investigators, risking perversion of the
investigative process. Arguably, the deceptions in those instances also interfere with the
reasoning processes of—and the respect owed to—the deceived parties, and are likely to
influence their behavior.”).
172. Note that the Speech or Debate Clause provides a constitutional defense to certain
defamatory speech by federal legislators only in certain limited circumstances. See, e.g.,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (“Voting and preparing committee reports
are the individual and collective expressions of opinion within the legislative process. As such,
they are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Newsletters and press releases, by contrast,
are primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum; they represent the views
and will of a single Member. It does not disparage either their value or their importance to
hold that they are not entitled to the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.”); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1973) (“Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that
everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is not a legislative act within the protection
of the Speech or Debate Clause. . . . Members of Congress may frequently be in touch with
and seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government, but this conduct ‘though generally
done, is not protected legislative activity.’ Nor does the Speech or Debate Clause protect a
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not do so. Some states, for example, choose to permit defamation actions against state
or local government speakers,173 and some commentators urge the amendment of the
Federal Tort Claims Act to permit similar actions against federal government
speakers.174
The foregoing examples prohibit lies in certain settings, to certain audiences, or
that cause certain harms regardless of the identity of the speaker. Other
nonconstitutional constraints on lies take a speaker-specific approach. As an
illustration, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct impose an explicit duty of truthfulness on judges and on government actors
(and others) who are also members of the bar.175 For example, Arkansas suspended
former President Clinton’s state bar license for five years176 after a district court’s
finding that he was in contempt of court “by giving false, misleading and evasive
answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process” in Paula Jones’s civil
litigation against him.177 As is the case with perjury prohibitions, such constraints
seek not only to address the potential harms of deception to individual parties but
also harms to the public’s trust in the administration of justice more broadly.
Some speaker-specific approaches target lies only by certain government speakers.
For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose heightened
requirements of truthfulness on prosecutors as a particular type of government
speaker,178 again to prevent harm both to individual litigants as well as to the public’s
collective trust in the criminal justice system.

private republication of documents introduced and made public at a committee hearing,
although the hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972))); Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d
311, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We reaffirm the common law rule and settled constitutional design
that elected representatives must answer for libelous statements made outside the scope of
their legislative duties.”).
173. See Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
174. See Cortez, supra note 30, at 1391.
175. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(11) (2007) (prohibiting judges and
judicial candidates from “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, mak[ing] any
false or misleading statement”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2014) (“A
lawyer shall not knowingly[] make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2014) (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not knowingly[] make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.]”);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2014) (“It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to[] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]”).
Although many disciplinary actions under these rules punish lies like fraud or perjury that
violate other legal constraints, some hold lawyers and judges to higher standards of
truthfulness by punishing lies that would likely not be punishable if uttered by nonattorneys.
See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002); In re Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203 (Or. 2004).
176. Neal v. Clinton, No. CIV 2000-5677, 2001 WL 34355768, at *3 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Jan.
19, 2001). The State also assessed a fine of $25,000. Id.
177. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
178. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2014) (requiring prosecutors not only
to refrain from lying but also to make affirmative disclosures in some circumstances); Bennett
L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 313–14 (2001)
(“[T]he prosecutor has a legal and ethical duty to promote truth and to refrain from conduct
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The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may offer another possible constraint on
certain government speakers. Some commentators have urged courts to interpret, or
Congress to amend, the APA to invalidate any final agency action as arbitrary and
capricious when the agency seeks to support it with inaccurate assertions (presumably
including lies).179 Relatedly, some courts have interpreted the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) to prohibit agencies from issuing environmental impact
statements that are based on false, inaccurate, or misleading data.180 Consider too the
proposed (but never enacted) speaker-specific Executive Accountability Act, which
would criminalize executive officials’ knowing and willful false statements to promote
the government's use of military force.181 Again, such lies can threaten both individual
and collective harm.
Statutory approaches also offer opportunities for specifying nontraditional remedies
for harmful government lies that may lessen enforcement concerns.182 For example, a
statute could require removal or rescission of the government’s lie rather than impose
civil damages183 (much less criminal sanctions), or could require counterspeech in the
form of an official declaration or reprimand. Along these lines, James O’Reilly has

that impedes truth. The courts have explicitly recognized the existence of this duty, and have
implicitly recognized this duty by reversing convictions when a prosecutor engages in conduct
that undermines the search for truth.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 314–15 (“The duty is found
as well in the prosecutor’s domination of the criminal justice system and his virtual monopoly
of the fact-finding process. More than any other party in the criminal justice system, the
prosecutor has superior knowledge of the facts that are used to convict the defendant, exclusive
control of those facts, and a unique ability to shape the presentation of those facts to the factfinder.” (footnote omitted)).
179. See Cortez, supra note 30, at 1376–77 (“Congress should declare that adverse
publicity is ‘final agency action’ under the APA and is reviewable for an abuse of discretion
. . . .”); id. at 1377 (“[C]ourts should recognize a cause of action under the APA or via
procedural due process, if applicable.”); O’Reilly, supra note 30, at 536.
180. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 811–13 (9th Cir.
2005) (finding that the agency’s use of inflated, inaccurate, and misleading data violated
NEPA).
181. H.R. 743, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to prohibit knowingly and willfully making
materially false statements for purpose of garnering congressional support for use of American
military); S. 1529, 111th Cong. (2009) (same).
182. Remedies for constitutional violations generally include civil damages, injunctions,
declaratory relief, the exclusion of evidence (acquired through a constitutional violation), and
habeas relief. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of
Houston, and Remedial Rationing, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 82, 83–84 (2009) (describing
various remedies); Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the
Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2454–79 (2014) (same). For a proposal urging greater
creativity and flexibility in devising remedies that balance speech and other concerns more
generally, see David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135.
183. On the other hand, others suggest that damages remedies are among the most effective
vehicles for deterring harmful government behavior. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 56, at 269–70;
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
363, 368 (arguing that a damages remedy would be more effective in deterring Fourth
Amendment violations than the exclusionary rule). Note, however, that damage awards for the
deprivation of constitutional rights that involve neither physical injury nor economic loss are
often quite limited. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309–11 (1986).
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proposed the statutory creation of agency ombuds charged with responding to
complaints about inaccurate agency speech (presumably including complaints about
alleged agency lies).184 The United Kingdom has adopted a similar approach, creating
an independent government watchdog agency specifically charged with assessing and
publicizing the (in)accuracy of the government’s speech.185
Finally, legislatures can strengthen and expand statutory protections for government
whistleblowers who help expose the government’s lies (and other misconduct).186 Such
statutory protections are especially important in light of the Supreme Court’s failure to
protect many government whistleblowers as a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, the
Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos frustrated efforts to hold the government
accountable for its lies by rejecting the First Amendment challenge of a prosecutor
punished for reporting what he believed to be a misrepresentation by the police in
seeking a search warrant.187 Related legal efforts could include more vigorous
enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act in which judges are more skeptical and
demanding of the government’s factual claims.188
B. Political Checks
Political remedies offer alternative means for constraining the government’s
deliberate falsehoods.189 Political responses to government lies include campaigning,

184. O’Reilly, supra note 30, at 538–39; see also Cortez, supra note 30, at 1438 (urging
use of an ombuds or chief information officer “to review disputes about agency publicity” to
“generate more credibility with industries and the media, and perhaps deter litigation”).
185. See Carl Bialik, This U.K. Sheriff Cites Officials for Serious Statistical
Violations, WALL S T. J. (June 3, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB124398720006979435 [http://perma.cc/LQ27-TLSD].
186. Because the problems of government lies are not unrelated to the problems of
government secrets, we can also learn a great deal from recommendations by secrecy experts.
See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First
Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 409, 411 (2013) (urging that “leakers merit robust First Amendment protections against
prosecution” to support the information flow necessary for a thriving democracy); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233 (2008) (discussing the value of leaks and whistleblowers in
ensuring government accountability).
187. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment
does not protect public employees’ speech pursuant to their jobs—including their truthful
reports of government lies and other forms of misconduct—so long as such reports are part of
their official duties). I have discussed this problem extensively elsewhere. See Helen Norton,
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to
Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009) (describing multiple cases in which lower
courts invoked Garcetti to permit government employers to punish employees who truthfully
sought to expose the government’s misconduct). The Court’s more recent decision in Lane v.
Franks narrows Garcetti in only one very limited context, holding that the First Amendment
protects public employees who testify truthfully as to government misconduct when such
testimony is not part of their regular job duties. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377–82
(2014).
188. See Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1099 (2014).
189. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles
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voting, lobbying, petitioning, and (with respect to certain government speakers)
impeachment.190 Some observers point to Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek
re-election and Richard Nixon’s resignation as examples of successful political
challenges to executive branch lies about military matters or its own misconduct.191
Political efforts also include vigorous legislative oversight of alleged executive
branch lies; examples include congressional proposals to establish a select committee
to investigate incomplete or inaccurate information provided by the federal
government’s intelligence operations.192 Legislatures can also deny funding to
agencies engaged in lying.193
Political pressure might also encourage the government’s self-regulation of its lies
and other inaccuracies. James O’Reilly, for example, has urged agencies voluntarily
to adopt internal controls for rooting out inaccuracies more generally:
Agencies should articulate written standards for issuing different forms
of adverse publicity, particularly via new media. These standards should
address the content of announcements and establish both internal
procedures for issuing publicity and procedures for private parties to
request corrections or retractions through timely administrative appeals
—all subject to reasonable exceptions for emergencies and other
justifications in the public interest. Agency self-restraint is perhaps the
most effective and most realistic response.194
Such an approach could also be applied specifically to government agencies’ lies.
Agency Inspector Generals (IGs) offer a related internal check on government’s
inaccurate speech, including but not limited to its lies. Nathan Cortez, for example,
has described how the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Inspector General
investigated and exposed the agency’s inaccurate publicity allegedly intended to

into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 101 (2013) (“In the political sphere, we have many
extralegal mechanisms to reinforce fiduciary obligations: elections, civil society, newspapers,
and watchdog groups are as much a part of the tapestry of fiduciary governance as courts
are.”).
190. The U.S. Constitution, for example, provides for the impeachment of federal judges
and certain executive officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
191. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 229.
192. Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 917 (discussing structural checks to executive branch
secret keeping); Papandrea, supra note 9, at 468; see also id. at 466 (describing other political
checks, including Congress’s ability to “conduct hearings, subpoena testimony and
documents, leverage its power in the appropriations and appointments process, and pass
statutes that require periodic reports from the executive branch”).
193. Congress has long barred federal agencies from unauthorized expenditures to engage
in “publicity or propaganda.” E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76,
§ 718, 128 Stat. 5, 234 (“No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall
be used directly or indirectly, including by private contractor, for publicity or propaganda
purposes within the United States not heretofore authorized by the Congress.”). The
Government Accountability Office has interpreted (but rarely enforced) this language to
include agency lies and other forms of deception about the source of its communications. See
Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the Government Is the Speaker, Not
the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 229–32 (2011).
194. See Cortez, supra note 30, at 1376.
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embarrass its target.195 More recently, the Veterans’ Administration’s Office of
Inspector General documented a variety of misrepresentations by the agency with
respect to waiting times and other matters related to patient care.196
Norms of behavior offer another potential nonlegal check on government lies. In
the United Kingdom, for example, a Ministerial Code outlines expectations of ethical
conduct for ministers who lead government departments.197 Section 1.1 of the Code
states that “Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave in a way that upholds the
highest standards of propriety,”198 and section 1.2(c) describes this expectation more
specifically to prohibit lies to Parliament:
It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful
information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest
opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be
expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister[.]199
Without question, the legal200 and political201 approaches described in this Part
are far from perfect. But the range of available possibilities should encourage us to

195. Id. at 1424; see also Papandrea, supra note 9, at 473 (“IGs have played an important
role in increasing transparency, arguing for reform, and pushing for accountability.”).
196. VA. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT NO. 14-02603
-267, VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF ALLEGED PATIENT DEATHS, PATIENT
WAIT TIMES, AND SCHEDULING PRACTICES AT THE PHOENIX VA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM iii (2014),
available at http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-14-02603-267.pdf [http://perma.cc/B3J4
-DHKA]; see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Watchdog Says V.A. Officials Lied, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/us/watchdog-says-va-officials-lied.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/S45F-52E7].
197. CABINET OFFICE, MAY 2010 MINISTERIAL CODE, 2009-10, H.C. DEP. 2010-1253
(U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/61402/ministerial-code-may-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/EY2A-3C79].
198. Id. § 1.1; see also Lesley Dingle & Bradley Miller, A Summary of Recent
Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 71, 88–89, 96 (2005)
(describing the expectations generated by these nonlegal norms); Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith
QC, Keynote Address, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1155, 1156–58 (2007) (same). Lawrence Sager has
relatedly argued that government officials have an “obligation to obey constitutional norms at
their unenforced margins” by “fashion[ing] their own conceptions of these norms and
measur[ing] their conduct by reference to these conceptions.” Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1227 (1978).
199. MAY 2010 MINISTERIAL CODE § 1.2(c).
200. For example, some commentators have urged that courts interpret, or Congress
amend, the Federal False Statements Act and similar statutes prohibiting lies to the
government to apply to a relatively narrow range of settings to prevent unfair surprise to the
unwary. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 409 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
the judgment) (suggesting a more circumscribed focus for the Act).
201. For example, Mary-Rose Papandrea is among those commentators to have identified
limits on the effectiveness of various political checks. See Papandrea, supra note 9, at 466
(“The executive, however, strongly resists Congress’s attempts to force the disclosure of
information, and there is very limited opportunity for judicial review of these interbranch
disputes.”); id. at 473 (“Nevertheless, the ability of IGs to check executive power suffers from
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think carefully about the specific settings or other circumstances that make
government lies especially harmful and then consider targeted nonconstitutional
responses.
IV. PROBLEMS AND APPLICATIONS
This Part applies the constitutional and nonconstitutional approaches described in
Parts II and III to a range of government lies. For these purposes, please assume that
the hypotheticals presented here are “lies” as I have defined them: false assertions of
fact known by the government speakers to be untrue and made with the intention that
listeners understand them to be true.
We start our analysis by assessing whether the government lie in question
infringes specific due process or free speech rights. If so, we apply strict scrutiny to
the government’s decision to lie; if not, we continue our analysis by first articulating
the remaining harm (if any) with as much specificity as possible and then considering
nonconstitutional approaches for addressing those harms.
More specifically, the government’s decision to lie in ways that deprive or coerce
the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty should trigger strict scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause, and the government’s decision to lie in ways that
coerce targets’ protected expression should trigger strict scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause. The government’s decision to lie should fail this scrutiny when
motivated by nonpublic (and thus noncompelling) reasons—for example, when the
government has lied to protect itself from legal or political accountability, for its
financial gain, or to silence or punish a critic’s protected expression. Governmental
decisions to lie should also fail this scrutiny even when motivated by compelling
public reasons when they are unnecessary to achieve such ends; for example,
coercive lies are by no means the only way—and thus are not necessary—for the
government to secure confessions or other evidence to support criminal convictions.
In certain rare circumstances, the government’s decision to lie may survive strict
scrutiny when necessary to achieve compelling government interests. This may be
the case when time permits no other option—for example, where the government’s
coercive lies are necessary to calm public panic in a public safety emergency or to
prevent a criminal from hurting a victim.202 Finally, under certain extreme

significant limitations; importantly, IGs are appointed and removable by the President, and
they cannot report even serious wrongdoing to Congress without first giving the relevant
agency head the opportunity to delete sensitive information.”).
202. For example, the Court has found that police interrogation of a suspect as to the
whereabouts of his gun did not violate the Constitution even absent Miranda warnings when
the questioner’s purpose was to protect the public from the gun rather than to secure a
confession or other evidence. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also United
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
the circumstances in which lies can be valuable as including lies told to calm public panic or
otherwise protect public safety). For the very rare exceptions in which the Court has upheld
the government’s regulation of speech under a strict scrutiny analysis, see Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding state bar association’s rule prohibiting judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions); Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding federal law that criminalized the knowing provision
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circumstances, even noncoercive lies by the government may violate substantive due
process protections when they lack any reasonable justification (i.e., when they shock
the conscience with their outrageousness) and thus constitute an abuse of
governmental power.
A return to the hypotheticals offered in the Introduction helps illustrate these
points.203 Consider first a secretary of state’s office—the office charged with
administering elections within that state—that lies to certain audiences about
where polls are located or when the polls will close in hopes of suppressing their
vote and increasing its political allies’ re-election prospects.204 Such lies are likely
to prevent some number of individuals who intended to vote from successfully
doing so and thus are functionally indistinguishable from locking the doors to the
polls. In other words, these lies—like lies about the existence of, or consequences
of exercising, constitutional rights more broadly—directly deprive targets of a
constitutionally protected right for reasons that should fail strict scrutiny, and thus
violate the Due Process Clause.
As discussed earlier, the government’s lies present especially hard
constitutional problems when the causal connection between the lie and the
deprivation of a protected liberty interest remains unclear.205 For these reasons,
consider next a department of labor’s lie that deliberately misstates unemployment
rates to improve the incumbent’s prospects in an upcoming election. On one hand,
the government’s nonpublic purpose here is identical to that in the polls
hypothetical above, such that the decision to lie will fail strict scrutiny if strict
scrutiny is applied. On the other hand, however, the threshold question whether the
lie has coerced voting rights (which is the trigger for the decision to apply strict
scrutiny) presents a harder constitutional problem here. The multitude of reasons
that inform voters’ choices greatly complicates efforts to establish a direct
connection between the lie and its targets’ voting decisions. In other words, the
first example involved a government lie about the process of voting that is very
likely to affect targets’ ability to cast a vote, while this second example involves a
government lie about a substantive matter that may or may not influence voters’
decisions. Nor are voters generally particularly vulnerable or captive (except,
perhaps, at the polling place206), thus lessening the lie’s coercive potential. For

of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization as applied to plaintiff’s
attempt to provide money, training, and advocacy to groups so characterized); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding content-based ban on political
speech within 100 feet of polling place).
203. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
204. In addition to potential constitutional claims, moreover, lies in this very specific
setting can also be addressed by statutes prohibiting lies about how, where, and when to vote.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1005.1 (2011) (prohibiting knowingly false communication of
election information about the time, date, or place of voting). Lies about voting rights that
specifically disadvantage voters based on race may also violate the Voting Rights Act. See 52
U.S.C.A. § 10101 (2015).
205. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, hard questions
can also arise about whether the government’s lie has deprived its target of what is actually a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
206. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding state ban
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these reasons, this government lie is harder to characterize as depriving, or
coercing the deprivation of, liberty in ways that should trigger strict scrutiny. A
variety of nonconstitutional options may thus be more appropriate for addressing
the harms posed by such lies. For example, a legislature could establish agency
watchdogs empowered to scrutinize the agency’s own data in contested cases.
Other options include vigorous oversight by legislatures or inspectors general as
well as political pressure to adopt self-policing protocols.
Next consider a governor’s office that issues an investigative report or a press
release that deliberately and falsely covers up its own illegal conduct. The harms are
largely the same as described in the preceding example: although the lie frustrates a
range of free speech values (especially, but not only, democratic self-governance), it
does not coerce speech or voting decisions, even while intended to shape them.207 If,
as I have proposed, we focus on coercion as the appropriate constitutional touchstone
in most cases, we must acknowledge that we are choosing to insulate (for
constitutional purposes) government lies that inflict significant if less specific harms
in exchange for a more manageable enforcement standard—again, no easy choice.
Here too nonconstitutional options, however imperfect, may be preferable. For
example, government’s lies about its own misconduct can be addressed by statutory
approaches that target certain specific settings (e.g., lies that obstruct justice, lies
under oath, or lies in the context of legislative hearings or other investigative
settings). Such efforts can be reinforced by vigorous legislative oversight that
requires the relevant officials to testify under oath or in other settings regulated by
statute, as well as by strengthened legal protections for whistleblowers who can
expose these lies.208
Consider next an agency’s defamatory targeting of its critics. Suppose, for
example, that a state enforcement agency issues a press release that seeks to
punish and silence a longtime critic by falsely asserting that she has engaged in
illegal misconduct and thus damages her job and business opportunities. This lie
seeks to coerce its target’s expressive choices for nonpublic—and thus
noncompellling—reasons that fail strict scrutiny, and violates the Free Speech
Clause.

on soliciting votes and distributing campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place
entrance in part to achieve state’s compelling interest in protecting voters from intimidation
and undue influence).
207. As noted supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text, this Article focuses only on lies
by a government body or by an individual empowered to speak for such a body. It thus does
not address lies by individuals—including individual political candidates, both challengers
and incumbent—when expressing their own views in a personal capacity and who thus have
First Amendment rights of their own.
208. Of course, the constitutional and statutory checks discussed throughout this Article
only operate after the fact once a lie has come to light through, for example, investigation by
the press or by other government actors, or exposure by whistleblowers. In addition to
punishing such lies (and perhaps compensating or redressing their victims) after the fact,
however, such checks may be valuable by deterring such lies before the fact, as well as by
performing law’s “expressive function” in establishing norms apart from controlling or
punishing behavior directly. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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The government’s defamatory lie may also deprive its target of interests protected
by the Due Process Clause by damaging her reputation. To be sure, this would require
the Court to revisit Paul v. Davis to hold that reputation is a constitutionally protected
liberty (or property) interest.209 Because reputation remains valuable even if not
constitutionally protected, these concerns can also be addressed through
nonconstitutional means like eliminating government immunities to statutory or
common law defamation claims.
As yet another example, consider a Surgeon General’s Office that undertakes
an informational campaign in the public schools that seeks to boost sales of
products manufactured by the administration’s political ally by falsely reporting
their health effects. Such lies frustrate the search for truth (especially given the
office’s presumed expertise on health matters), undermine listener autonomy by
skewing consumer and health choices, and may distort political debates about
proposed regulatory action. Here the government’s lie targets a relatively captive
and vulnerable audience of young people in the public schools who have limited
options for exit and counterspeech. The combination of a vulnerable audience
together with the government’s nonpublic motive distinguish this example, in my
view, as a more direct threat to constitutionally protected interests than
controversial public education campaigns more generally, and thus this lie may be
sufficiently coercive of its targets’ expressive choices to violate the Free Speech
Clause. Nonconstitutional options also remain available, and again include
setting- and audience-specific statutes, the establishment of agency watchdogs, and
vigorous legislative oversight.
Finally, government lies about the justification for military force offer
especially vexing problems, as they portend disastrous harms together with
substantial enforcement challenges. For example, a President’s lies to Congress
and to the public about the reasons for U.S. military intervention threaten a range
of shattering injuries, both individual and collective, as they can lead to the loss of
lives by both civilians and soldiers, the ruinous diversion of national resources, and
a substantial loss in public trust. Such lies also undermine the public’s ability to
engage in democratic self-governance, threaten listeners’ autonomy by skewing
their political choices, and frustrate the search for truth. In addition, such lies
concern a national security matter on which the President will often have greater
(and perhaps monopoly) informational access, thus limiting opportunities for
meaningful rebuttal.
On the other hand, establishing the link between the President’s lie and the actual
decision to go to war (and the resulting loss of life and liberty for due process
purposes) may be difficult, as many factors generally influence that causal chain of
events. Characterizing such a lie as coercive is similarly challenging, as the
congressional and public audience is neither captive nor vulnerable (except, perhaps,
to the extent that the President has a monopoly on information on this topic).
Furthermore, one can easily anticipate that constitutional litigation challenging such
assertions as lies might be motivated by partisan rather than public interests, and that
the judiciary might thus be reluctant to second-guess choices made by the President

209. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
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when exercising her Article II powers.210 Nonconstitutional possibilities include
enhanced protections for whistleblowers who can expose the lie, vigorous
enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act, and aggressive congressional
oversight. In light of the challenges raised by constitutional enforcement efforts in
this context, many may prefer these nonconstitutional responses as the best among
imperfect options.
These complexities suggest that the government’s most catastrophic lies may
be those especially resistant to redress under an individual-rights framework that
offers possibilities for constraining only those government lies that injure
identifiable individuals in relatively tangible ways. Such a framework may be
considerably less well-suited to address more collective harms, no matter how
severe.
But perhaps lies about the justification for military force may be among the
extreme cases where the dreadful consequences of the government’s lie coupled
with a corrupt governmental motive (and the government’s motive will assuredly
be key to this determination) are sufficiently outrageous to constitute an
unconstitutional abuse of executive power. In other words, this may be among those
government lies that are so venal that they could, and should, shock our collective
conscience and thus be found to breach our expectations—protected by the Due
Process Clause—that our government should not behave outrageously in its
dealings with us.211
CONCLUSION
Lies are complicated and powerful, and so is the government. The government’s
lies can be devastating. They can also sometimes be relatively harmless, and
occasionally even helpful in advancing the public’s interest. We need to empower
our government to operate effectively to protect us and our interests, even while
we reasonably fear, and should take steps to protect ourselves from, its ability to
harm us. As Michael Walzer has written, “I suspect we shall not abolish lying at
all, but we might see to it that fewer lies were told if we contrived to deny power
and glory to the greatest liars—except, of course, in the case of those lucky few
whose extraordinary achievements make us forget the lies they told.”212 In this
Article, I have suggested a range of approaches that seek to “deny power and glory
to the greatest liars” even while recognizing that some harmful government lies

210. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Law Matters, Even to the Executive, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1015, 1015 (2014) (describing national security policy as the area in which “we find judicial
deference at its highest, the centralization of modern government at its most pronounced,
delegations of authority to the executive at their broadest, and contempt for idealism at its
most self-satisfied”).
211. Relatedly, recall that public fiduciary theory suggests that the public should expect
the same loyalty from its government as it would from other fiduciaries in whom it has placed
its trust. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Due Process Clause to forbid government action that shocks the conscience offers a possible
constitutional basis for enforcing those expectations as a constitutional matter.
212. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 160, 180 (1973).
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will nevertheless likely escape redress. In so doing, I have sought to start a
conversation about how courts—and the rest of us—might think about the
constitutional and other implications of the government’s lies, recognizing that
others might choose to strike the balance quite differently.

